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ABSTRACT

PROCEPTIVISM: APPLYING BUCHLER’S THEORY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT TO ART,
DANCE, AND CHOREOGRAPHIC METHODS

by
Michael Stephen Blue
November 2022
In 1951, philosopher Justus Buchler crafted Toward a General Theory of Human
Judgment, a seminal work that changed how philosophy examined human judgment. One central
and guiding principle to Buchler's theory is what he called “proception,” a lens through which to
freshly view human experience. Specifically, proception is a philosophically appropriate
substitute for the term “experience,” and refers to the process by which the human individual
relates to their world as a cumulative being. Buchler describes in copious detail how the
individual accomplishes proception by way of judgments or “utterances.” That is to say, crucial
to relating to the world as an individual is judgment, and essential to judgment is expression.
Human expression likewise has many philosophic layers to it, but none are more critical
than the creative aspect. While Buchler rarely addresses creativity and the arts in his philosophy
of human judgment, I argue that his ideas about judgment and proception imply that the creative
process is at the core of human experience, or proception. Thus, this study reevaluates human
judgment as it relates to creativity and the arts. I explore how to apply the key elements of
Buchler’s theory to the arts, and particularly dance, an endeavor I have dubbed “proceptivism,” a
new approach to both Buchler’s theory and the arts.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"Every living moment represents an implicit discovery."1
—Justus Buchler

In the year of his death (1991), the American Philosophical Association (APA) offered a
brief biographical account of Justus Buchler and his work, in which they stated that one of the
prevailing aspects of Buchler’s career was the great diversity of topics he tackled, ranging
anywhere from “poetry to God.”2 Yet no topic in the great spread of Buchler’s philosophic
discourse is more mysterious and metaphysical than his theory of human judgment, which boldly
offers an entirely new perspective on “human experience,” or what Buchler calls “proception.”
In Buchler’s seminal work, Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment, he defines
proception as the process in which an individual’s “whole self is represented.”3 Though this
explanation may at first appear as overly brief and quixotic, there are many layers to Buchler’s
basal and succinct statement on proception, a concept which unfolds tirelessly within his theory
of human judgment. Likewise, I have found that Buchler’s great unraveling of proception
potentially provides a vast and mostly untapped resource for the arts, particularly when it comes
to art theory, criticism, and creative process (just as other integrations of philosophy in art have
done in the past). The purpose of this study, therefore, is to prod the theory of human judgment

1

Justus Buchler, Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment (New York, NY: Columbia University Press,
1951), 45.
2
Sydney Gelber and Patrick Heelan, “Justus Buchler 1914-1991,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 65, no. 1 (September 1991): 22.
3
Buchler, Toward a General Theory, 5.
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and apply Buchler’s philosophical lens of proception and judgment to a discussion on art and
specifically dance.
Necessarily, this investigation also looks into the function of proception within the
context of art-making, or the process of constructing artistic expression.4 I also take into careful
account other key elements of Buchler’s theory, such as judgment, communication, and
validation, among others. As a whole, the adoption of these concepts for the understanding of art
I refer to as proceptivism, though this approach tends toward a focus on Buchler’s fundamental
notion of proception. I posit that proceptivism rings especially true for dance and choreography,
which I demonstrate as inherently conducive to such an application, with many parallels existing
naturally between dance theory and the theory of human judgment. However, before I fully
introduce Buchler’s theory, I would be remiss if I did not first begin with a general outline of
Buchler as a philosopher and his connections to various schools of philosophic thought—all of
which influence his ideas of proception and the context for my own application of proception to
art and dance.
When glancing over Buchler’s long academic career as a philosopher, it becomes
immediately apparent how difficult it is to place Buchler into a singular, specific school of
philosophy. However, Buchler was arguably first and foremost an avid follower of the Socratic
method, which in turn shaped his own ideas on philosophic discourse—a format this study will
naturally adopt. In his own words, “a method is a power of manipulating natural complexes,
purposively and recognizably, within a reproducible order of utterance; and methodic activity is
the translation of such a power into the pursuit of an end—an end implied by the reproduction.”5

4

David Bayles and Ted Orland, Art & Fear: Observations on the Perils (and Rewards) of Artmaking (Santa Cruz,
CA: Image Continuum Press, 1993).
5
Justus Buchler, The Concept of Method (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961), 135. Emphasis my
own.
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Simply deciphered, Buchler offers here the framework that supports his overall approach to
philosophy, including his theory of human judgment: utterance he uses as a synonym for
judgment, and method is the purposeful action of judgment that is ordered and reproducible, and
in this way produces a discernable product.6
Though the Socratic method, well-known for its “defining terms,” is of obvious
influence, at the start of Buchler’s academic career he also became heavily absorbed in the
writings of the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, who is widely seen as the primary
originator of pragmatism in philosophy. Buchler, in fact, wrote his dissertation on Peirce.7 To
this day, a simple search in most academic databases will generate hundreds (even over a
thousand) citations of Buchler’s works with regard to Peirce, far outweighing his other writings.
It could even be said that, in some contexts, Buchler is best known for his work on Peirce.
Considering the significance of Buchler’s involvement with the subject of Peirce, it may not
appear odd that Buchler is not more often viewed, alongside Peirce, as belonging to pragmatism
rather than to metaphysics. Granted, Peirce dealt with metaphysics to a great extent, and it is
commonly seen as one of the three main categories of his system of thought. Moreover, it is easy
to see the roots of Buchler’s metaphysics in Peirce which, as APA’s biographical sketch
mentions, he develops well beyond Peirce’s own discussion.8 Indeed, pragmatism as a system
owes a lot to the pairing of Buchler and Peirce—it is difficult to find a discussion within this
school without at least one citation of Buchler’s edited Philosophical Writings of Peirce.9 In
addition, it has been said that Buchler’s insights into metaphysics “provide a sound ontological

6

I offer further explanation of these terms, including manipulation and natural complex, in the sections and chapters
that follow.
7
Justus Buchler, “Charles Peirce's Empiricism” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1939).
8
Gelber and Heelan, “Justus,” 23.
9
Charles S. Peirce and Justus Buchler, Philosophical Writings of Peirce: Selected and Edited, with an Introduction
by Justus Buchler (New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1955).
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basis for interpreting Perice’s point that there are no fixed limits to inquiry,”10 which itself
echoes the Socratic method.
Though a seamless transition from Peirce’s pragmatism would appear to branch
immediately into metaphysics for Buchler, so too can the case be made for naturalism. Prominent
members of contemporary systems of naturalism, such as John Ryder or Robert S. Corrington,
credit Buchler as a pragmatic naturalist, referencing, of course, Buchler’s Peircean influences.11
In addition, Ryder and Corrington lump Buchler in with the so-called Columbia School of
naturalism, which has been described as the origin for many secular forms of naturalism, with
Buchler’s ideas acting as arguably the most developed source.12 Ryder, who did his dissertation
under Buchler, is considered to be at the forefront of the Stony Brook School, which carries on
the system of thought initiated by Buchler and others of Columbia Naturalism (e.g., John Dewey
and John Herman Randall Jr.).13 While Ryder is somewhat guilty of relaxed methodological
plurality over a more directed Socratic method as Buchler would have it, Ryder pushed
pragmatic naturalism forward based on metaphysical and ontological perspectives stemming
from Buchler’s ordinal naturalism, which aids his fluid method to nevertheless not be considered
“flabby pluralism.”14 Ryder takes into account “experience” much in the same way that Buchler
discusses proception and suggests that the “original, naturalist trait of pragmatism”15 from the
Columbia School be reabsorbed by naturalism so as to reject extreme relativism and its denial of

Gelber and Heelan, “Justus,” 23.
Robert S. Corrington, “The Things in Heaven and Earth: An Essay in Pragmatic Naturalism,” review of The
Things in Heaven and Earth, by John Ryder, American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 35, no. 3 (September
2014): 279.
12
Corrington, “The Things in Heaven,” 279.
13
Ibid.
14
Alicia Garcia Ruiz, review of The Things in Heaven and Earth, by John Ryder, European Journal of Pragmatism
and American Philosophy VI-1, (July 2014): 2.
15
Ruiz, review of The Things, 2.
10
11
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objectivism.16 In his later work, particularly those pertaining to his theory of human judgment,
Buchler has retained this philosophical value to a great extent, and yet balances neatly between
objectivism and the relative reality of the individual experience.
These and other principles from Buchler carried over to Corrington as well. Chief among
them are Buchler’s concepts of ordinal nature, natural complexes, and ontological parity.
Corrington paraphrases Buchler’s concept of ordinal nature the most succinctly. The term
“ordinal nature,” as he puts it, means that nature is “ordinal” in the sense that it is “constituted by
innumerable intersecting and relevant orders.”17 In other words, as Ryder too points out, nature
does not function as one, all-encompassing, “superorder,” but rather an indefinite number of
orders in relation to one another. Nature is likewise devoid of any one definitive order that stands
in total isolation; “there is no set of sets or a perfect self-representative series.”18 Buchler’s logic
and method here, resounded by Ryder and Corrington, in turn resounds the Peircean assertion
that there is no fixed limit to inquiry, which further evidences the viewpoint of Buchler as,
specifically, a pragmatic naturalist. Yet, in a published conversation between Buchler and
Corrington, Buchler says he is “very wary of Columbia naturalism,” and likens the movement to
an “addendum to scientific faith.”19 In this conversation, Buchler criticizes Dewey’s assertion
that naturalism follows the scientific method, which Buchler labels as “dogmatic,” and says that
Dewey “corrupted the idea of naturalism in his A Common Faith,” specifically mismodeling a
definition of “God as the relation between the practical and the ideal” based on George (Jorge)
Santayana’s own definitions.20 Moreover, Buchler rejects any attempt to ultimately define nature.

16

John Ryder, The Things in Heaven and Earth (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013).
Corrington, “The Things in Heaven,” 279.
18
Ibid.
19
Justus Buchler and Robert S. Corrington, “Conversation between Justus Buchler and Robert S. Corrington,” The
Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3, no. 4 (1989): 261-262.
20
Buchler and Corrington, “Conversation,” 261-262.
17
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He offers that nature is “a metaphysical category which is... ubiquitous and all-embracing,” and
“that its metaphysical definition... should be in constant process of being built.”21 Buchler is
somewhat tolerant of entertaining the idea of crafting a philosophical equation for “God,” but
gives the impression that, if even possible, it would be the result of a long process we haven’t
come close to arriving at.
All in all, Buchler concludes “I can’t really say ‘I am a naturalist.’”22 As we can see here
already, Buchler can be a difficult man to place into a specific philosophical genre, but this I
argue presents great potential for an application of Buchler’s thoughts to fields not immediately
considered in the context of academic philosophy, such as the arts. In other words, this elusive
quality to Buchler as a philosopher does not necessarily make his work less approachable.
Rather, it evidences his availability to a diverse array of applications, including the arts, though
this is an opportunity not yet exploited by the arts or any philosophy that takes the arts on as a
subject of inquiry or application.
Others scholars and philosophers are beginning to separate (though not completely
remove) Buchler from the naturalists, particularly pragmatic naturalism. For example, in his
2013 book The Orders of Nature, Lawrence Cahoone makes the clear distinction between the
“ordinal naturalism” of Buchler and the pragmatic naturalism of Dewey and the Columbia
school.23 The ordinal perspective on nature is, for Buchler, in many ways inseparable from what
he calls “natural complexes.” As Buchler and subsequent naturalists contend, there is no
“universal trait,”24 or any trait that may claim its fixity as a thing-in-total. As Buchler states:

21

Ibid., 263.
Ibid., 262.
23
Lawrence Cahoone, The Orders of Nature (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013).
24
Corrington, “The Things in Heaven,” 280.
22
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“Whatever is, in whatever way it is, is a natural complex.”25 Or, as Corrington puts it: “To call
something a natural complex is to provide a conceptual and experiential clearing within which it
can exhibit its own and its relational traits.”26 A complex can have traits, but these traits are
found both within itself and within orders “beyond itself,”27 with fluid ordinal process. In this
way, one can also describe Buchler as an “ordinal naturalist.”
The placement of Buchler’s philosophy is further supported by his own criticisms of the
philosophical principle of ontological priority, which asserts that one entity is prior to another in
being. Buchler sets up a “more real model,” or a contrasting principle of ontological parity, to
address the issue that if one subject is prior to another, then it necessitates the subject with
ontological priority is more real. Buchler makes the point that one subject cannot be more real or
fundamental than another, thus every natural complex exists relative to another, hence its
ontological parity. However, this does not require any natural complex to be prior to another.
Therefore, Buchler’s concept of a natural complex is interdependent with his own notion of
ontological parity and, conflated, represent the foundation of his views on ordinal nature.
According to this view, Buchler also does not refute the existence of God, but neither does he
give priority to God. Moreover, though he occasionally touches the subject, Buchler appears to
be generally unconcerned with the idea of God and the divine.
Buchler’s ordinal approach has thus often been described as “secular naturalism;”
through ontological parity, the divine is no more fundamental than any other natural complex.
This means that “God” lacks priority to its creation. That is to say, whether or not a supreme
being exists, its philosophical reference cannot be held higher than natural phenomena, nor is it

25

Justus Buchler, Metaphysics of Natural Complexes, ed. Kathleen Wallace, Armen T. Marsoobian, and Robert S.
Corrington, Second, expanded edition (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), 1.
26
Corrington, “The Things in Heaven,” 280.
27
Ibid.
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more real or prior in existence—both the source and the products of creation exist
simultaneously, and are each a natural complex. In this way, Buchler (arguably far more so than
any naturalist prior to him—no pun intended), takes naturalism out of a traditionally theological
context and pushes it finally into the pure arena of philosophical discourse. In this sense Buchler
has demonstrated his aptitude for being adaptive and progressive as a philosopher rather than
rigid. His infidelity to tradition is a quality that again lends itself well to diverse applications of
his philosophy, as I have already shown to be the case. Yet, despite this fact, the arts remain
mostly untouched.
Further considerations include descriptions of Buchler’s philosophy as American realism,
positivism, non-reductive naturalism, ordinal phenomenology, constructive postmodernism,
systematic non-foundationalism, deconstructivism, and even “hard-core pluralism,”28 among
others. Obviously, the scope and intended focus of this study restricts me from addressing all of
these viewpoints, but listing them gives a sense of the vast and unique philosophical ecosystem
that is Buchler’s work. That said, there are a few other points to touch on that further illustrate
the art-potential found in Buchler’s overall works, that includes and permeates through his theory
of human judgment. Firstly, besides his strong Peircean influence, it is important to make note of
his involvement with transcendental philosophy—specifically, concerning the works of
Santayana. Though Buchler does not buy into the ontological priority that Santayana explores
extensively (which has been described as a “materialist”29 form of naturalism), and he criticizes
Santayana’s claims at having utilized Peircean symbolism,30 he shares Santayana’s non-reductive
approach. The non-reductive style is somewhat paradoxical, as it both affirms the transcendent

28

Ibid.
Angus Kerr-Lawson, “Santayana's Non-Reductive Naturalism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 25,
no. 3 (1989): 229.
30
John Lachs, “The Proofs of Realism,” The Monist 51, no. 2 (April 1967): 289.
29

9

and denies it. The non-reductive style has been since attributed to Santayana, who never
described himself as such, but he exemplifies the attitude by asserting belief in substance, while
simultaneously arguing that the given qualities of a thing do not exist. Belief in the ultimate
qualities of a thing, he explains, leads to faith in the description of reality rather than knowledge
of the object itself.31 Santayana thus attempts to stray from what Buchler called “scientific faith,”
and places philosophic emphasis on the material thing transcendent of reductive quality. Indeed,
Buchler has referred to his own theory of human judgment as a type of “objective relativism.”32
Buchler comes by this influence honestly—a good deal of his early work was devoted to
Santayana.33
Ironically, Buchler’s tendencies toward the secular space in philosophy, via metaphysics,
seems to partially circle back to the spiritual. Buchler was himself the son of a prominent Rabbi,
Samuel Buchler, and the student of philosopher Morris R. Cohen—founder of the Conference on
Jewish Relations, and one of the first American Jews to hold a regular professorship in
philosophy.34 [Cohen steered Buchler’s study of Peirce, and Buchler’s Metaphysics of Natural
Complexes is considered, in large part, to systematically reflect Cohen’s metaphysics.35] This in
mind, it could be said that Buchler owes at least some of his method and philosophic endeavor to
his Jewish roots in Talmudic study and debate. Not surprisingly then, Buchler’s philosophy
appears to accommodate the mystical. For one, Martin O. Yalcin has recently suggested that

Kerr-Lawson, “Santayana’s,” 230-231.
Justus Buchler, Nature and Judgment (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1955), 128.
33
E.g., Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews by George Santayana, ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin
Schwartz (New York, NY: Scribner’s, 1936).
34
Lawrence Cahoone, “The Metaphysics of Morris R. Cohen: From Realism to Objective Relativism,” Journal of
the History of Ideas 78, no. 3 (July 2017): 449-450.
35
Cahoone, “The Metaphysics,” 468.
31
32
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Buchler’s ordinal naturalism provides the most accessible concepts in metaphysics to facilitate
understandings of the sacred.36
What could be considered a pleasant surprise, so to speak, is some association between
Buchler’s philosophy and feminism. Felicia E. Kruse has applied Buchler’s ordinal metaphysics
to discussions on nature within the context of ecofeminism—the view that ecological issues are
simultaneously feminist issues, and that ecological wrongs (e.g., deforestation) often negatively
impact women, particularly in developing nations but also in American society.37 Though I
would not classify Buchler as a feminist,38 what makes this application appropriate is, as Kruse
points out, the fact that his ordinal view and concept of natural complexes “resists the Cartesian
drive” to set up a hierarchal scheme—his work is thus inherently a great equalizer, since he
rejects ontological priority.39 In her review of pragmatism in relation to feminism, Marjorie C.
Miller likewise notes Buchler’s “reconceptualizing reason” which manages to avoid a dichotomy
that traditionally sets up “categories symbolically associated with the male and derived in
exclusionary or dominating relation to traits symbolically associated with the female.”40 Perhaps
Buchler’s well-known activism in anti-McCarthyism, and his Vice Chairmanship for the
National Academic Freedom Committee of the ACLU, has also helped him gain some attention
as it concerns human rights and philosophy.
In sum, in light of Buchler’s diverse philosophical connections and wide possibility for
application, I as a dancer, choreographer, and performance studies scholar propose two new
36

Martin O. Yalcin, Naturalism's Philosophy of the Sacred: Justus Buchler, Karl Jaspers, and George Santayana
(New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2013), 466.
37
Felicia E. Kruse, “An Ordinal Context for Ecofeminism,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1995):
15.
38
Though Buchler makes persistent use of the male pronoun to refer to the universal human, this was considered
standard practice during his time and was even expected.
39
Kruse, “An Ordinal,” 23.
40
Marjorie C. Miller, “Feminism and Pragmatism: On the Arrival of a ‘Ministry of Disturbance, a Regulated Source
of Annoyance; a Destroyer of Routine; an Underminer of Complacency,’” The Monist 75, no. 4 (October 1992):
451.
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considerations of Buchler’s theory. First, that proception is a creative process; this perspective
can both inform art-making and provide insight into the creative process. I assert that exploring
proceptivism is necessary to expanding discussions on the theory of human judgment—not only
when it comes to notions on art, which is a philosophically anemic sector of Buchler’s theory,
but on certain principles that I argue are incomplete. Second, I suggest dance as a direct and
suitable medium for exploring what I call “proceptivism,” particularly in the way that the
embodied process of choreography not only brings awareness to proception in art but enlivens
procept (a unit of proception) with movement. In the following paragraphs, I lay out a brief
outline of the coming chapters to illustrate the framework by which I accomplish the
aforementioned considerations.
Having outlined Buchler’s philosophical affinities in this chapter, in chapter 2 I review
the primary associations between Buchler’s work and the topics of art and art-making, sparse
though it may be. Not only do I view art as an underdeveloped consideration in the theory of
human judgment and among Buchler’s wider works and influences, but I also further address
Buchler’s ideas on poetry, pointing out his overall deficit when it comes to linking poetry with
art. Inevitably, this process of review puts added focus on Buchler’s theory of human judgment,
which not only serves as the philosophical reservoir for this study but, as I point out, is the
connecting undercurrent to his philosophic work as a whole. Naturally, it becomes essential in
chapter 2 to more fully introduce Buchler’s theory of human judgment, explaining its key
concepts and an overview of core principles.
In chapter 2, I discuss the concept of proception and its general meaning, providing what
can be considered an operational definition specific to this study. I then explain the units of
proception, or procepts, along with the proceptive domain and the proceptive dimensions of

12

manipulation and assimilation. In addition, I outline the relationship of procept to product, and
show the fundamental differences between perspective and proception. Other primary
components of the theory covered include communication and its categories of reflexive,
asymmetrical, and symmetrical, as well as what is crucial to communication: Buchler’s ideas on
community. I also discuss the modes of convention and compulsion. Last, but not least, I offer
basic understandings of judgment, which is as fundamental to Buchler’s theory as the concept of
proception, though even more difficult to pinpoint.
Having thus crafted a context for Buchler’s theory related to proceptivism, in chapter 3 I
turn my focus to the relationship of proception to discussions on the subject of art and artmaking—the core of proceptivism. I revisit the needs for exploring proception and human
judgment through the lens of art and art-making, and vice versa, approaching art by way of
Buchler’s theory. In particular, I take into account Buchler’s concepts of query, validation, and
communication. Furthermore, I look at the role communication plays in art, and the interplay of
community and artist within the art-making process. It is my hope that chapter 3 demonstrates
how proceptivism, or the process of proception in art and art-making, not only nourishes a
starved subject within the theory of human judgment, but enhances and revitalizes the theory. In
this way, I posit that proceptivism has a genuine potential to be impactful for the theory of
human judgment.
In chapter 4, I move from highlighting the art-deficit in Buchler’s theory to emphasizing
the opportunities. In other words, at multiple points within the theory of human judgment, I show
how proceptivism may be incorporated and applied. Specifically, it is in this chapter that I shift
toward an application of proceptivism to ideas on dance. I initiate this transition by asking the
necessary question, “why dance?,” when considering an art-medium for the spotlight. I address
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this issue with the simple assertion of movement as the crux of proception, which I demonstrate
with further review of Buchler’s principles, placing special attention on communication,
spectatorship, meaning, and validation. In addition, I describe these principles in terms of dance
theory, borrowing extensively from Laban Movement Analysis (LMA).
Chapter 4 also takes into account a transcription of ideas from the previous chapter to
elements of choreography, demonstrated through the analysis of a choreographic work I have
been involved with, a piece called The Kiln. I uncover frequent cognates in dance theory to
Buchler’s theory, as made evident in The Kiln, and I reiterate Buchler’s notions of query in the
context of this choreography. Overall, The Kiln functions as a case study or working example of
how artists can directly apply proceptivism to analysis and creation. Also, my analysis
emphasizes how dance is a natural and convenient subject for proceptivism, with many existing
overlaps between LMA and the theory of human judgment. Moreover, this analysis hints at how
an application of proceptivism to dance creation might be accomplished, and how further
development in this direction of both analysis and applied choreography might enhance the
literacy of current movement theories, such as LMA.
Overall with this study, I endeavor to apply Buchler’s theory to more in-depth
discussions on art and art-making, a current gap in scholarly discourse. (Even Beth J. Singer’s
book, Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler,41 which has
been described as the only one of its kind in encapsulating the philosophic system of Buchler’s
work,42 only ever loosely touches on the subject of art). I argue that Buchler’s theory of human
judgment can be advanced by developing in this direction, and perhaps requires it. This is a

41

Beth J. Singer, Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler (Lewisburg , PA:
Bucknell University Press, 1983).
42
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sentiment Buchler shares: “the theory of judgment needs to introduce a category that will help us
understand the exploratory character which may belong to any type of judgments on the
methodic level, and therefore to poetry;” he continues to explain that art and poetry are,
respectively, a “species” and “sub-species” of query.43 Secondly, I review dance as an artmedium under the lens of proceptivism. In addition, I attempt to formulate connections between
the principles of choreography and the principles and ideas of the theory of human judgment, and
argue dance as a suitable artistic medium for such a direct application. Alongside these efforts,
however, I hope to make Buchler’s work, particularly his theory of human judgment, more
visible. As I have illustrated here, it is difficult to ultimately categorize Buchler as a philosopher;
his background and those who have claimed him as their own represent a diverse array of
thought. This has meant that Buchler has remained somewhat inaccessible to the mainstream,
artists and art critics included. Yet, in my opinion, it also shows his great talent as a philosopher.
Therefore, it is my wish that this study helps to initiate Buchler’s work into focus among a
broader audience (especially as it may concern art), and for subsequent review of my own ideas.
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CHAPTER 2
A MISSED OPPORTUNITY IN BUCHLER’S THEORY

As outlined in chapter 1, Buchler belongs to a multitude of philosophical veins, but with
no central pledge of allegiance at its heart—what, then, is the guiding or cohesive element to his
work overall? Of course, this is an ambitious question, but to begin to answer, it is essential to
examine Buchler’s ideas on judgment, a philosophical concept that permeates the lion’s share of
his discussions, particularly post-Peirce, and provides an excellent opportunity for exploring art
and art-making. Despite the fact that judgment and proception are not often discussed or
explored in connection with art or the creative process, and virtually nothing has been explored
when it comes specifically to art-making (especially among the so-called “fine arts”). But what
exactly has, in a general sense, been said?
Beginning as far back as his philosophical tangling with Peirce, we see some evidence of
the importance of art to Buchler. In particular, with Peirce’s semiotics (which he spells
“semeiotics”) or sign theory, which accounts for any signification, representation, reference, or
meaning.1 In Peirce’s own words, he describes a sign as: “Anything which is so determined by
something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call
its interpretant, that the later is thereby mediately determined by the former.”2 Though Peirce’s
own extensive writing on the subject (which Buchler toiled over early in his career) does not
clearly state a connection with art, and it is said that Peirce’s personal interest in art was
“minimal,”3 and that he was “moved more by meals and fine handkerchiefs than by the art he
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saw.”4 Nonetheless, we see substantial evidence for the significance of art by way of an
application of Peircean philosophy in subsequent explorations, especially as it concerns visual
art. Critic Michael Leja, for instance, posits that “Peirce’s writings have had immense appeal for
analysts of visual culture in recent decades. This is sometimes attributed to the special capacity
of his semiotic theory to accommodate visual signs.”5 Gary Shapiro, a contemporary of Buchler,
also makes use of Peirce’s idea of a sign as a way to facilitate more “intelligible” interpretations
of art.6 Considering Shaprio’s study helps illustrate how extensive philosophical discussions on
art can be if they stem from Peirce’s work with signs, even though Peirce himself held little
regard for art. This consideration, in turn, can show the potential Buchler has harbored for an
application of his philosophy to art, as it extends from Peirce.
By understanding an artwork as a sign (“something that stands for something to someone
(or to another sign)”), Shapiro suggests that, while restricted in meaning “by its own nature and
its object,” a sign in art is nevertheless “open to interpretation because it must address some
interpreter.”7 However, he points out that though some interpretations are acceptable, others may
be nonsensical, causing the signs in art to posses “partial indeterminacy.”8 Shapiro asserts that if
signs in art are to be coherent, this is accounted for by considering the general characteristics of a
sign, which itself does not “determine its own interpretation, but requires interpretation.”9 Hence,
the angle Shapiro takes assumes a discussion of an artwork’s meaning demands an exploration of
its interpretation.10
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The meaning of an art-sign is often thought of as one dimensional, especially when
conflated with the artist’s intention, which Shapiro describes as being “a condition of the sign’s
being meaningful.”11 Though not meaning’s dependent variable (and, as the author notes, has
been a primary mode of considering an art-sign’s meaning by intentional-istic theorists like
Erwin Panofsky). In other words, in terms of Peirce’s semiotic triad (sign-object-interpretant),
an art-sign’s object is not its meaning but its own interpretant, or the rule that determines its
interpretant.12 Yet, as critics of semiotic theory have pointed out, it appears that an art-sign’s
meaning is also not totally open to interpretation since there can be no way of identifying the
most significant or unique interpretant. Or in other words, “no single interpretant is adequate”
since the interpretant, of which there are an indefinite series, also functions as a sign, thus
producing meaning that is indeterminable.13
Contrary to Peirce who suggested an “ultimate” interpretant of a sign or “intellectual
concept,”14 Shapiro offers the consideration that there may be different types of signs, and that
artistic semiosis could be its own animal, and further addresses the issue with a fresh perspective
on the symbolic aspect of an art-sign. Shapiro rejects a unique interpretation, recognizing that if
this were the case we would have to think of a complex art-sign with only one single meaning.
Yet, he gives us a sort of middle ground where, as previously mentioned, interpretations can be
more or less acceptable; however, just like in art, this function “leaves out far more than it
includes.”15 And the performing arts, with their ephemeral nature, further complicates the
pragmatic method of Peirce.
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Additionally, Shapiro opens up a fresh viewpoint on the symbolic aspects of an art-sign.
He argues that an art-sign’s object is not an icon, nor is it indexical, but neither is it simply a
concept. This is because the material aspect of a word that expresses the concept does not lend to
its meaning, and may even inhibit understanding or communication. Poetic meaning, conversely,
may be heavily steeped in the sound sequence of its recitation, which then becomes “lost in
translation” if read as simple text.16 But meaning in art is not a fixed, static fossil—symbols grow
through their interpretation, what Peirce would call a “living” symbol which retains its identity
through change.17 Moreover, symbols are not to be confused with icons and indices, which are
“natural signs;” symbols require convention, being that they must be both general and repeatable.
Thus, according to Shapiro, the relation of an art-sign to its object must be symbolic (an idea that
runs near to Buchler’s own assertions on art-sign and communication, which speaks to his
influence on Shapiro).
Shapiro is also cognizant that it is necessary to reconcile intention with an art-sign, but he
wrestles with it more than he pins down any definitive answer. He arrives at suggestions that are
part empirical in approach, and part pluralistic, but does not come to any clear conclusions on the
matter beyond a recognition that aesthetic theories (which attempt at some fundamental formula
for intention in art) have each failed to be wholly convincing, and he essentially leaves the issue
there. That said, though Shapiro appears to have fallen short of the mark as far as concluding
anything about intention in art, he addresses thoroughly issues of art object, art-sign, symbolism
in art, and interpretation, as I have detailed above.
Buchler addresses this problem of intention adequately in his theory of human judgment,
and in his ideas on poetry, even if it is not entirely direct. Indeed, Shapiro cites Buchler’s post-
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Peirce works when commenting on the metaphysical promiscuity of determinacy. In addition,
many of Shapiro’s assertions, which are soaked in semiosis, echo Buchler’s theory of human
judgment, in particular those of signs, communication, and community. Furthermore, in his
musings on intention, though Shapiro’s emphasis on the importance of an experience in art
[Shapiro openly borrows from Dewey’s assertion that the “product of art... is not the work of
art,” the work in art being an outcome that “is an experience that is enjoyed because of its
liberating and ordered properties”18] is equally anemic of philosophical commitment and detail
as to that of intention, Buchler supplements vigorously with his theoretical principle of
proception, which I will return to extensively in later chapters.
To reiterate, although Peirce does not concern himself directly with art, considerations of
Peirce’s thoughts on semiosis have nevertheless influenced several studies on the interpretation
of art, including Shapiro, and Peirce’s ideas also persist to ripple through critiques of actual
artworks, both material and performative artworks. Even if seemingly in passing, these nods to
Peirce (which by extension often includes Buchler’s influence, as well as being an influence for
him) can have obvious impact on artists and art critics. For example, in a discussion on Lamia
Joreige’s Objects of War, an ongoing multimedia installation first exhibited at the Tate Modern
in 2000, critic Laura U. Marks briefly references Peirce’s The Fixation of Belief (from Buchler’s
edited publication), quoting the famous line: “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a
state of belief.”19 While, at first glance, Marks cites Peirce almost offhandedly, she also borrows
from Peirce to set up a guiding concept that is significant to her critique (though his work does
not endure any further reference). Indeed, it is significant to her pitch: Lamia’s work showcases a
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collection of mundane or “banal”20 objects from the daily lives of those who experienced the
Lebanese Civil War, which are placed around the exhibition hall for onlookers to peruse. Each
object acts as a story during wartime that is told by the respondents—though the focus of the
story is the object, the war becomes an overwhelming presence.
According to Marks, these objects “tease” and “irritate” memory that aids new
generations to “rewrite history through action in the present.”21 Peirce wrote copiously on the
ways in which we arrive at a fixed belief or opinion, and Marks seems to have forged a similar,
implicit connection. According to Peirce, logic and the scientific method offers the most sound
method for forming belief or opinion, for which doubt is its great servant. For Marks, Objects of
War provides a cognate of irritation: it prods at the seductive powers of forgetting (and with it,
the oppressive forces of silence), and it spurs us into dialogue. As with Peirce, the artwork is a
line of inquiry that gravitates toward opinion and belief. And even more so for the consumers of
the art than the respondents: it is a propulsion into motion, rather than an acceptance of dead
beliefs without living and relevant discourse. The onlooker thus becomes part of the object’s
story instead of simply witnessing cold artifacts. Though Shapiro deems considering works of art
as artifacts “old and trivial,” he grants that by means of the Peircean artifact being exhibitive of
its “artifactuality,” there is an openness without limitation.22 In this way, nearly anything can
semiotically account as artifact, which in turn may be seen as a “work of art.” In her critique,
Marks alludes to this same concept, pointing to artifacts of war that have made their way into the
artistic arena and are now, literally, works of art.
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In another instance of Peircean influence by-way-of Buchler, R. Swearer attempts to skip
over issues with the critic/interpreter and artist dyad by proposing various lenses by means of
“conceptual art.” Though Swearer makes no claim at having formulated an artistic “treatise,” in
his study The Artistic Proposal, he molds viewpoints based on the framework of conceptual art,
or “the chain of actions and reactions set in motion by twentieth century modernism.”23 He
quickly asserts that a primary goal of conceptual art is to “abolish the role of critic/interpreter,”24
which leaves only the role of the artist: as you step into the world of art creation you are
immediately part creator. This happens by means of expressing ideas more than consumable
material works and aesthetics.25 His argument is driven by an almost invisible influence from
Peirce, especially when it concerns the symbols and signs that reference the conceptual work,
and our inference as we engage with these symbols and signs. In particular, Peirce’s Logic and
Signs, from Buchler’s edited publication, sparkles through, and is loosely cited: logic being the
determinant in physical reality with respect to navigating the arbitrary nature of art’s signs.26
Hence, Swearer offers yet another example of the ghostly presence Peirce (and by extension
Buchler’s early philosophical work) has had on art investigations, being arguably significant but
remaining indirect and background.
It is important to mention that in the aftermath of Peirce, semiotics has itself had more
direct influences on art and art criticism, though after acquiring a comfortable distance from
Peirce both chronologically and philosophically, yet with fidelity to the basic purpose of his
original sign theory. These different and ever-expanding areas of semiotics with artistic impacts
include cognitive semiotics, literary semiotics, and pictorial semiotics, to name but a few.
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Bearing in mind these Peircean influences on art and art discussion in the modern era, it is not a
giant leap of the imagination to assume Buchler had also absorbed Peirce’s semiotic attributes
and applied them to thoughts about art. In addition, there are emerging scholars and studies that
directly connect Peirce and Buchler. For example, in Armen T. Marsoobian’s study of Peirce’s
semiotic triad, he admits openly that his analysis relies heavily on Buchler’s general theory of
human judgment.27 Specifically, Marsoobian borrows Buchler’s terms of exhibitive and assertive
“interpretants” to “revise Peirce’s formulation” in order to better interpret poetry and music,28
and he cites Buchler’s own works on the topic of poetry. On the other hand, Shapiro warns of the
limitations of Peircean semiotics in connection to art and states that there is danger in
appropriating his ideas for this purpose.29 Yet, ironically, Shapiro too has taken a smidge from
Buchler beyond Peirce, because he relates the determinacy of art signs to Buchler’s query, a
principle in his theory of human judgment.
The art-deficit in the original Peircean perspective Buchler has himself attempted to fill,
with some direct discussion on art, and with a focus on poetry. This effort is best represented in
Buchler’s book, The Main of Light,30 which is devoted entirely to the subject of a philosophical
analysis of poetry. The title for this work is curious, as it is taken from Shakespeare’s sonnet 60,
and implies the destructive power of time, the “60” from sonnet 60 representing “our minutes,”
just as sonnet 12 stands for the 12 hours on a clock. The “main of light,” in this context of time,
could be seen as the light in its inchoate stage before it eventually wanes into “eclipse,” or
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sunset. In his book, Buchler attempts a core understanding of poetry, or its “main of light,”
which he immediately refers to as “an elusive domain of art.”31
While he does not claim to have revealed the “nature of poetry,” Buchler introduces his
intention to better understand poetry—not only through philosophy but also, in-particular, his
theory of human judgment. Moreover, Buchler states that any philosophic attempt to define
poetry must “concern itself with the kind of human utterance that poetry is;”32 utterance is, for
Buchler, synonymous with judgment. It is therefore necessary for him to reconcile an “elusive”
quality of language, and Buchler contends as much, writing that the task to place poetry within
the framework of judgment “in turn requires that we become clear, or at least clearer, about the
concept of utterance or judgment.”33 Therefore, Buchler admits it is essential to his theory to
tackle the issue of poetry and, by extension, art. He acknowledges that “poetic utterance, and
artistic utterance in general,”34 are thinly covered in his theory and in related schools of thought,
and it is a subject which “had simply never been dealt with satisfactorily on the foundational
level.”35 Indeed, The Main of Light was meant by Buchler to accompany four other books on the
subject of metaphysics, natural complexes, and human judgment.36
Why Buchler focuses on poetry beyond all other forms of art is largely a fact of its
obvious cognate with utterance; though both employ language, they are yet “wider and
philosophically more basic than the concept of language.”37 Moreover, though poetry uses
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language, “not all language can be poetry.”38 While Buchler begins with broad and generous
notions on poetry, he subsequently dives into such specialization that he ultimately evades the art
question. Buchler seeks to “illuminate what it means to be an instance of poetry,”39 though in
action he transcribes poetry into such particular considerations (or “viable philosophic
language”40) that his arguments do more to set poetry aside from art than to exemplify poetry as
a form of art—art with such qualities that permeate all mediums. These arguments, in the vein of
“metaphysics of the human process” toward “a general ontology,”41 function to pigeon hole
poetry as a “specific kind of human complex.”42 Buchler shows us this aspect of poetry in a
convincing and eloquent manner, but he “differentiates the poetic product”43 all-too-well, and in
effect almost isolates poetry from art.
Across the board, Buchler makes sparse mention of the word “art,” and the Main of Light
is no exception. Where art is referenced, Buchler examines its quality and function, which he
extrapolates from ideas on poetry far more than any general discussion. For instance, Buchler
asserts that “when language is poetic it is exhibitive in function,”44 and he labors to refine this
function in terms of human judgment. He extends this notion to art on the whole, writing that
“exhibitive judgment [is] exemplified on the methodic level by art,” and it is “the process
whereby men shape natural complexes and communicate them for assimilation.”45 I will revisit
the concept of assimilation later, but suffice to say, Buchler has offered a reduction of art to a
specific function, which he has found to be true of poetry. In this study, I retain this idea of art as
exhibitive judgment to a large degree, but I also challenge this as an over-simplification. Thus I
38
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intend to make new assumptions and to utilize concepts found elsewhere within Buchler’s theory
to approach art and judgment in a more wholistic manner.
To reiterate, in The Main of Light, Buchler applied his theory of human judgment to ideas
on poetry. Though in doing this, he philosophically isolated poetry (not falsely but severely), so
that it nearly became removed from a general application to art and art-making. This focus is part
and parcel of the need Buchler expresses in “clarifying essential differences with the artistic
mode of utterance.”46 The task itself reflects his address to the issue of whether or not there is a
hierarchy of artistic mediums or disciplines. While Buchler entertains the notion, he pits George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Santayana against one another to illustrate how, though they
overlap on the idea of poetry as being “apex” in importance among the arts, they differ
fundamentally. Buchler shows us Hegel and Santayana’s essential flaws in espousing a
hierarchal system, though the question does spur him into a specialization of poetry over general
notions on art. However, Buchler does not give up on Hegel’s assertion of poetry’s
“universality,” refining the concept to mean that “there is no specifiable content that poetry
cannot deal with.”47 In addition, Buchler appears to preserve both Hegel and Santayana’s view
that “poetry is older than artistic prose.”48 In other words, while perhaps not superior to other art
forms (as Buchler does not accept a hierarchal scheme), poetry nevertheless has an almost
boundless scope that can elude prose or tangible artistic medium. This may account for Buchler’s
focus on poetry, since it can thus be seen as presupposing of all other art, and that he is
compelled to effectually set poetry apart. However, such a motivation could certainly be
described as a betrayal to ontological parity.
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Though not nearly as oft-cited as his associations with Peirce, Santayana’s work also was
impactful to Buchler’s philosophic career and outlook, particularly in Buchler’s attraction to
poetry. And it is no surprise that art holds such great potential within Buchler’s theory, as
Santayana provided several opportunities for art-discussion. Santayana, like Buchler, saw
potential in art to reveal reason, claiming that “of all reason’s embodiments, art is... the most
splendid and complete.”49 This is made so, Santayana argued, by the imagination. However,
Santayana also considered religion to be within the realm of the imagination, and though he did
not believe in the existence of God, he placed religion in this context above art and, even,
philosophy. He stated that religion was “the head and front of everything.”50 Buchler takes issue
Santayana’s use of the word “imagination” and attempts to refine the concept philosophically.
Nevertheless, Buchler arguably addresses the problem from a subjective standpoint, as the
subjective process in human judgment is crucial, which mirrors Santayana’s consideration of the
“real world,” in comparison with imagination, as “ashes in its mouth.”51
In addition, Buchler may have been influenced by Santayana’s idea on art’s function.
Critic Willard E. Arnett summarizes clearly the many distinctions within art that Santayana
makes; which, as aforementioned, Buchler has both criticized and, to a certain degree, adopted.
Arnett seems to divide Santayana’s review of the arts into two groupings, one as aestheticism,
which concerns itself with beauty, and all other forms of art that are spiritual or rational.
Santayana saw the fine arts as both “a value of the imagination” and (contrary to criticisms that
Santayana demeaned the fine arts) that it was possible for the fine arts to be products of spirit and
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reason, if they are not restricted by purely aesthetic goals.52 In other words, “the creation of
beauty is not the only function of the fine artist.”53 For Santayana, the function of art was “to
interpret and transmute all vital aspects of life, and not simply to increase and intensify the
sensuous joys.”54 Granted, Buchler does not concern himself much with the form art takes
(outside of poetry), nor does he accept that some artforms or artistic endeavors have more
philosophic integrity than others. However, Buchler does also, with his tunnel vision for poetry,
evade philosophic investigations into the fine arts and working artists (beyond scattered mention
and broad allusions). Similarly, Buchler reflects Santayana’s attitude that, though perhaps not
disapproving of the fine arts, disregards a singular focus on their aesthetic values and function.
For Buchler, proception and judgment are by nature processes that “interpret and transmute,”
which closely mirrors Santayana’s ideas about the function of art.
Santayana and Buchler part ways more obviously when it comes to views on nature. For
Buchler, nature is composed of natural complexes, and the ordinal process does not ultimately
differentiate from nature, spirit, animal, and human. Conversely, Santayana distinguished
between natural and spiritual morality, and for Santayana, it is spiritual life that propels the arts
and philosophy, as well as religion, and even science, to develop and express “positive values of
human existence.”55 However, as Arnett points out, “spiritual” for Santayana does not mean
superior to nature, though rather the “completion” of it.56 It seems likely that Buchler adopted
this template from Santayana, that Buchler then utilized to iron out metaphysics into a more even
playing ground (that is, the “natural complex”) being that Santayana, despite his hierarchal
scheme, is also inclusive of lower functions as necessary and part of the same system. In this
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way, the two philosophers differ in degree rather than in kind. Furthermore, Santayana, though
accused by Arnett as sloppily blurring lines between poet and philosopher (e.g., Three
Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe),57 is defended still by Frederick W. Conner
and Richard Rorty alike, who assert that Santayana accomplishes the view that “poetry and
philosophy have nothing in common.”58 Although Buchler works toward query in poetry, among
other overlaps, he nevertheless holds onto a similar distinction that has likely stemmed from
Santayana.
The concept of creativity as inherent to nature, whether completed by spirit as Santayana
suggests or shaped and communicated for assimilation as part of the proceptive process as
Buchler posits, has likely informed the basis to an interesting notion in philosophy known as
“transcendental creativity.” The idea, proposed by Leon Niemoczynski in 2013, is a strong
reaction to “ecstatic naturalism” formulated by Corrington (a student of Buchler’s), and appears
to borrow from Buchler’s Metaphysics of Natural Complexes. In brief, Niemoczynski rejects
Corrington’s psychoanalytic-semiotic method that attempts to address “Peirce’s
insufficiencies”59 when it comes to an ontology of signs in naturalism, but in essence
anthropomorphizes natural phenomena. However, Niemoczynski does share Corrington’s
allegiance to Buchler’s notion of “nature naturing” that creates “itself out of itself alone,”60
writing that “nature naturing retains a significant (and hence “divine”) ontological integrity
because, as a source of all creation, all of creation ultimately depends on it.”61 In addition,
Niemoczynski accepts Corrington’s denial of a classical theist’s deity, and that nature is
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impersonal to human experience. This view is shared by Ryder (once a student of Buchler’s),
who suggests that the disregard of a dogmatic interpretation of “nature” allows us to consider the
arts as “cognitively significant activities.”62
But what Niemoczynski truly contributes is his to investigate what he calls “speculative
naturalism” as a “phenomenological aesthetic” of nature naturing.63 This looks specifically at
nature as creation, and as divine, though beyond human psychoanalytic understanding. Yet,
nature cannot ever exist outside of what we know to be evolution—nature is never a finished
product.64 The psychoanalyst is in the same danger as the classical theist of assigning human
attributes to nature or divine creation. The philosopher-artist, in this vein, treads a fine line
between “experimentation,” or the investigation that is “co-becoming... of qualitative feeling
within an aesthetic,”65 and “mere personal expression” that may “distort the nature of what is
created.”66 Niemoczynski asserts that, through aesthetic phenomenology, we may uncover the
transcendent that allows “the nonhuman to shine through what is nonhuman,”67 and thus
curtailing the anthropomorphizing of nature’s creativity. As will become more evident in this
study, Niemoczynski in his assertions obviously reflects Buchler’s own attitude toward nature,
and shows us how this basis of perspective is conducive to creativity.
The above summary of viewpoints clearly illustrates how far reaching and tangential the
dots to connect Buchler and art presently are in the literature. Eloquent though he is, even
Buchler strays into the weeds of poetry rather than directly and adequately apply his theory of
human judgment to art and art-making, which I consider a missed opportunity. Moreover, while
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Peircean influences on art are more plentiful (particularly if extended to the greater field of
semiotics), Buchler is a different philosopher and direct applications of his works to art
investigations remain slim, at best. Hence, the focus for this study concerns Buchler’s
contribution to ideas on human judgment, which in turn offers the most concrete philosophical
framework for exploring an application of Buchler’s thought to art and art-making (and yet, in
this regard, it is vastly underrepresented). Therefore, the main purpose of my exploration is to
apply Buchler’s theory of human judgment to discussions on art and art-making, as well as to
utilize these concepts in review of choreographic method (which I describe by means of LMA).
This approach I call “proceptivism,” which references Buchler’s central and guiding notion of
proception in human judgment. In addition, according to my recent survey, Buchler’s theory
could unfortunately be described as generally sluggish in the current literature. As such, it is my
hope that the application of art (i.e., proceptivism) will thereby reinvigorate Buchler’s
philosophy among contemporary discussion.
As mentioned in chapter 1, Buchler defines proception as the process by which an
individual’s “whole self is represented.” While this statement sounds grand, Buchler did not
necessarily intend it to be so. Buchler introduces the concept in such a way because his theory of
human judgment, to which proception is crucial, serves as a philosophical substitute to earlier
ideas on human experience. That is, Buchler attempts not only to review what we mean when we
say “experience” but to replace the word entirely with “proception”—what he considers to be
more semantically fulfilled. This more developed approach to experience (i.e., proception) I
utilize in this study to formulate ideas on art and art-making, and to apply directly to a review of
choreographic method. Crucial to these efforts also is the argument that proception is itself an act
of adaption and modification by the individual, and ordered by the individual (though
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inseparable from community). That is to say, proception is a process that is by nature creative—
hence proception is, fundamentally, a creative process. To proceive (or, if you like,
“experience”) is to create, on at least a basal metaphysical level. As I will show, my argument
and thesis contributes a new lens to Buchler’s theory. Moreover, this argument adds a new
perspective from which we may coherently analyze art and the creative process in general. This
approach is what I call “proceptivism,” which essentially functions as an investigation into
creative process that thereby can inform art-making.
However, for the remainder of this chapter, I will first outline the basic principles to
Buchler’s theory that are most pertinent to this exploration into proceptivism. The following
layout is intended to help explain core concepts for the purpose of making this study more
coherent, especially considering the recent decline in the usage of these philosophic terms.
Proception
The idea that must first be addressed is, of course, proception—it is the most fundamental
concept to the theory of human judgment (likewise to proceptivism), yet it can easily elude
understanding and appear mysterious. So far, I have only alluded to Buchler’s concept of
proception in its grandest form (e.g., “the process in which [an individual’s] whole self is
summed up or represented”).68 Unfortunately, Buchler himself does not directly define
proception to any great extent in his writings. Rather, much of what we know about this concept
in philosophy is indirectly inferred from the context of his discussions. Nonetheless, I will
breakdown down the general components of this otherwise broad configuring of proception and
thereby formulate a more precise operational definition to serve this study.
Although straightforward descriptions remain scant, Buchler immediately introduces
“proception” as a semantic substitute for the more loose and colloquial term of “human
68
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experience.” 69 However, that is not to say that proception is experience. Buchler does not bother
to redefine the word “experience,” which may lead to confusion, but specifies “proception” as a
type of process (an “interplay” between an individual’s “activities and dimensions”).70
Therefore, proception replaces experience on a semantic level, but does not do so
philosophically. Instead, proception offers philosophy new language through which to evaluate
“experience” as a metaphysical process of individuation. In addition, Buchler stresses that
proception is a natural process among an untold number of other natural processes (i.e.,
proception is as much a part of the natural world as any ecological function).71 This is because,
though the world exists objectively, the individual’s interface with the world is a lens of
proception, and to proceive is the individual’s “basic relationship” to an otherwise objective
reality, conscious or unconscious.72 Buchler writes, “For no one is there a world other than the
world he proceives.”73 At this point of contact, there is the cumulative and continual process that
constitutes the individual.
But there is another essential element to proception: movement. Buchler asserts that
proception is a “process of individuated movement.”74 Buchler further explains proception as the
“natural historicity” of the individual, and so any directed movement, or “propulsion,” is
necessarily cumulative.75 Proception is thus the cumulative action of the individual, who moves
through specific parameters Buchler calls “dimensions.”76 It follows, then, that the individual is
thereby always in motion, and to cease to move is to cease to proceive. Moreover, proception is
the movement or process in motion representative of the individual’s whole “experience” (both
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conscious and unconscious), referred to as the unitary direction, or “the composite, directed
activity of the individual.”77 [With all of this mind, it is no wonder Buchler did not consider
“experience” to be a philosophically appropriate word!]
Procept and Proceptive Domain
Being that proception is a process, it is important to ask what “substantive elements”
occur therein?—and to first tackle this issue, Buchler has offered the elements of procept and
proceptive domain.78 Most simply put, a procept is a unit of proception, proceptive domain refers
to the territory of individuated movement, and this motion that occurs requires proceptive
direction, along the aforementioned dimensions. More specifically, “a procept is anything that is
a property of the individual, that happens to him, that affects or characterizes him in any way at
all, so long as it relates to him as a proceiver (as an identifiable and cumulative individual) and
not as a mere entity in the cosmic maelstrom.”79 A procept is a unit that is part of an individual’s
proceptive domain, so long as it truly modifies and reinforces the individual’s proceptive
direction.80 Something might relate to the individual ontologically, but it may not modify or
reinforce their proceptive direction.81 For example, though some political decision in Scotland
might stand in relation to a Burmese national on the grounds of being human, or that it simply
exists, something so detached from the person in Burma cannot be said to be an actual procept
for that individual, lest it be observed.82
It is important to note that proception and individuation are not the same thing. Buchler
uses “individuation” more as a descriptor, since the proceiver “relates continuously and uniquely
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to a world,”83 and thus to proceive is also to be an individual. A procept is object or neutral until
it is “relevant to the individual as individual.”84 Proceptive domain, on the other hand, is a
structured amalgam of procepts—it is the process of proception that facilitates the order found in
a proceptive domain, whereas the proceptive direction is “the character of the potentialities in
proception.”85 Buchler explains:
“The concepts of proceptive domain and proceptive direction make it possible to express
the unity of the individual by emphasizing his continuity with himself, and the fluidity of
the individual by emphasizing his continuity with the world.”86
Categorized based on “perspectival distinctions,” Buchler divides the proceptive domain into
three general parts: imminent, floating, and gross. [Yes, a poor choice of words]. In the chapters
that follow, I will address these different domain types while applying Buchler’s theory to
explore ideas on art, what I call “proceptivism.” But in brief: the imminent domain concerns
abstractions of self out of time, as well as an understanding of the minimum context of a
situation of the individual; the floating domain comprehends the situation of the individual, and
the gross domain is the order that causes the situation to be discernable.87 In general, the
proceptive domain is a “subaggregate of the aggregate that constitutes [the individual’s]
world,”88 and the parts to domain are likewise interrelated.
The proceptive direction is composed of two correlative dimensions: manipulation and
assimilation, which Buchler considers core features of proception.89 Manipulation is essentially
an acting dimension, whereas assimilation has a spectatorial quality. Of course, Buchler points
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out that these attributes of proception happen in partnership, and are in fact two sides of the same
coin, two aspects of the same process. But we distinguish manipulation as the product of an
agent—the actions are deliberate, yet may or may not be adjustive (though often are).
Assimilation accepts and is not even necessarily aware,90 and depends on prior or current
manipulation.91 Together, the interplay of manipulation and assimilation form a fundamental
interpretation of proception (i.e., “experience”).92
Communication
Buchler sees communication as a “circular process,” because it “feeds” on procepts and
then “breeds” products which then provide potentialities for future procepts.93 Though
proception is distinct from communication, communication is paramount to proception in order
to operate. According to Buchler, if we were to remove communication from the equation
completely, proception would only exist in its most base and inchoate stage; it “would be little
more than protoplasmic endurance.”94 Communication is the “guiding mechanism” of
proception.95 Communication, in turn, depends on individual direction, and the transmission of
symbols for proceptive assimilation.96
There are three general types of communication: reflexive, symmetrical, and
asymmetrical. In all instances, the question of community is of importance. Reflexive
communication does not directly engage with community, but does so reflexively, or with the
community that permeates the individual. Symmetrical (also referred to as social)
communication “presupposes not only community but… joint manipulation and assimilation of
90
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signs correlated with the dominant procept.”97 Whereas asymmetrical communication offers
“new elements” for proceptive assimilation and manipulation indirectly by others, and tends
more toward ambiguity. For example, an officer who directs traffic communicates
symmetrically, but an orange cone placed in the middle of the road communicates
asymmetrically, and the lone driver who soliloquizes in response to the cone communicates
reflexively.
Perspective
The theory of human judgment makes special effort to distinguish a judgment from a
perspective, though the two are nevertheless interrelated, interconnected. According to Buchler,
a perspective is the “essence of a judgment, the condition and the potentiality of its
completion.”98 In other words, aspects associated with a judgment, such as “meaning, truth,
moral value, or social influence,” are come by some perspective.99 In addition, a judgment may
be connected to multiple perspectives, though not every property of the judgment may be related
to each perspective. That is to say, some properties of a judgment can be by virtue of one
perspective, and other properties by another perspective; varying moral standards, for example,
may emanate from a judgment but they do not each share the same properties. By this logic, a
judgment can express one or more perspectives, and within a perspective there is judgment.100
One apparent issue that the complex relationship of judgment and perspective leads to is
that of identifying a perspective, and to discern a judgment as related to one perspective versus
another. When aiming at a definition for perspective, Buchler describes a perspective as a sort of
“order in which a given set of natural complexes function as procepts for a given proceiver or...
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for a community of proceivers.”101 In this way, Buchler argues, a perspective is an aspect of a
natural process, and thereby belonging to proception.102 Yet, Buchler warns, it is erroneous to
identify perspectives by exact borders, with the exception only of “artificial” perspectives, such
as “formal calculus.”103 Though a perspective may be exclusionary, it nevertheless retains an
inexact nature (Buchler uses the example of Religious perspectives, which are often both narrow
and vague simultaneously.104) However, Buchler does offer that a perspective is a general order
that may highlight a “given situation,” which is itself “determinable in the last analysis by
convention.”105
Convention
In a later segment on compulsion, I will address convention as a term from Buchler’s
theory, which is indeed a core concept but not one I consider as necessary to introduce out of
context. Succinctly put, “convention” can be either a social or proceptive process that concerns
products (e.g., “situations”), and configures products into a specific coherency by distinguishing
what is relevant from what is irrelevant. Convention does not necessarily imply a cultural
obligation.106 How we understand a “situation” might be, at its heart, an abstract character
resulting from compulsion (a concept I introduce in this chapter’s final segment), though we
detect its fuzzy limits via convention.107 These boundaries are further blurred by the
entanglement most situations have with other situations, and thereby intertwined perspectives.108
Yet beyond convention, the most general order that provides coherency is the proceptive domain,
which can be considered the perspective of “greatest comprehensiveness for the individual,” that
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directs the discernment of all perspectives for the individual.109 That is to say, the proceptive
domain is the individual’s “widest perspective.”110 Perspective is therefore neither synonymous
with judgment nor proception, it is a factor of the two.
Community
At its most simple, a community consists of at least two proceivers.111 However, the
individual also constitutes a community within, which Buchler declares as reflexive or proceptive
community, and it is through reflexive communication that reflexive community is actualized.112
But beyond what is reflexive, community is thought of by Buchler as two or more proceivers for
whom a certain natural complex functions as a dominant procept.113 This type of community
Buchler discerns as a social community; just as reflexive communication actualizes reflexive
community, the “character of proception” is either partly or completely influenced by a social
community.114
Another type of community recognized by Buchler is the invisible community, or
communities that exist in a scope beyond our immediate awareness, in objectivity. They are
determined by a proceptive direction. However, the invisible community is invisible not purely
as a result of a lack of awareness, but because of the “crude natural edges of individuality and the
stubborn pervasiveness of nature.”115 In other words, community is invisible because of the
fuzzy metaphysical quality of the “self” in the universe, and there are multiple invisible
communities. They can be the subconscious, subcultural product of oppressive erasure or silence,
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they can be “communities of memory,” and so on. Yet in all cases, what makes an invisible
community a community at all is the potential for “unanimous action or feeling.”116
Projects and Products
A procept may be represented as elements of sign-complexes, which Buchler calls a
“project.” Also, being sourced in reflexive communication, distinguishes a project as an
“instance” of query.117 However, this does not mean that every product is a project. While all
products are in some way an outcome of the proceptive direction, not all are the result of
reflexive communication. Therefore, it is important to Buchler to clearly define a project, inparticular, as a product of reflexive communication, which allows a project to retain the moniker
product as a general term, but not specifically. Splitting hairs, a project differs from a general
product in that it emerges reflexively and thereby has not yet realized its communicative
potential. Query transforms project into product (that is, a product of query) by fulfilling what is
available to communication. Moreover, projects beget their own products; and in actuality, these
sorts of products (also considered products of query) are most likely the outcome of multiple
projects.118
A project that becomes a product of query is composed of the sort of judgment that
comes from the arts and sciences, or judgments of “deliberative invention.”119 However, as is
often the case with art and science, not all projects coalesce into a socially available product. In
this way, the project is not necessarily dependent on social communication while operating
reflexively. In addition, projects (and even products in general) are considered “procept-
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transformations” that alter the proceiver’s relation to an object.120 In this study, the context in
which the word “product” is used should tell what type of product is being discussed.
Compulsion
The proceiver judges the world and the products of communication in two “modes”:
compulsion and convention.121 Moreover, each judgment is an expression of either compulsion or
convention, which Buchler explains further as a “terminus of the proceptive direction, or... of the
train of communication.”122 As mentioned, convention deals directly with the order of products,
from which the individual makes sense of these products via the weighing of options. But
through compulsion, the proceiver responds to a situation that is outside their grasp of control.
Perhaps counterintuitively, “convention” actually offers a freedom of choice, while
“compulsion” imposes conformity. This means that “a conventional judgment is the relatively
indifferent product among a possible group of alternatives,”123 whereas compulsion has no
alternative, nor are alternatives within the purview of the proceiver in that given situation.
Though I provide greater detail on compulsion in the coming chapters, at its crux,
Buchler recognizes a root form of compulsion, or what underlies all types of compulsion that
affect the individual, which he calls gross compulsion. This underlying condition speaks directly
to the limitations of proception, or the “finitude”124 and “essential fixity of the self.”125 But more
than that, Buchler describes gross compulsion as acceptive or assimilative, meaning that even in
our manipulation of products, we may only manipulate the properties that we have prior
accepted.126 Therefore, the judgment becomes the “sole product possible.”127
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Judgment
Judgement is a concept in Buchler’s theory that is delivered somewhat by osmosis. In his
seminal work, Toward a Theory of Human Judgment, he does not even include a chapter named
“Judgment,” but does include chapters named for all other foundational terms. Rather, like
proception to a degree (and they are interrelated), much of judgment is understood through what
we infer from lengthy discussion. Nevertheless, the concept of judgment is a paramount topic to
introduce. It is as central a notion to Buchler’s theory as proception.
Judgments are considered by Buchler as “crystallized manipulations” that serve to
“render nature assimilable.”128 The domain of judgments is thus composed of “nature in process
of self-illumination.”129 In the coming chapters I elucidate on this esoteric understanding of
judgment to shed light on the importance of the artist as self (or individual proceiver), and the
illuminating creative process. But more succinctly, judgments can be thought of as products (or
“ramified relationships”) formed out of a system of appraisal and pronouncement from the
individual.130 However, to also make product distinct from judgment, a product is a unit of any
thing which can be source to human “concretizations,” while judgment is product in its “ultimate
function, status, or direction.”131 A product alone is either crude material or a byproduct of
metaphysical or actual industry, whereas judgment is more like a finished product. Also, a
judgment stands out of time, in that the “circumstance of its origin do not comprehend its entire
being.”132 Or in other words, “the product is an event in time; the judgment is eternal... it always
represents in its utterance more than it reflects in its occurrence.”133
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Buchler subdivides judgment into three categories: active, assertive, and exhibitive
judgment. Active judgments involve some kind of action that is metaphysical, though sometimes
this action is also literally in physical motion. Assertive judgment are products that result from
true/false decisions. Exhibitive judgments are potentially the most dynamic, and are the products
of shaping, arranging, or manipulating material or signs. Moreover, a single product may possess
qualities that characterize some or all of the types of judgment, and to varying extents.
In the chapters that follow, I will both reference and expound on what I have outlined
above. However, this summary of terms particular to the theory of human judgment should serve
as a point of reference for the reader, to provide overall clarity. With this basic understanding,
we have already begun to unravel the yarn of proception; it is now time for us to follow this
thread deeper into new territory for the theory of human judgment: a direct application to art
discussion.
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CHAPTER 3
TOWARD A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON ART AND ART-MAKING

Discussions on the process of proception and human judgment in art and art-making, an
application I am calling proceptivism, are underdeveloped in the current literature, as illustrated
in the previous chapters. However, this does not mean that Buchler’s theory of human judgment
cannot provide ample opportunity to expand the concept of proception in terms of the creative
process. After all, proception is not synonymous with perception, which is limited to the sensory
scope of the individual and what sense can be made of it, be it by conscious, subconscious, or
impulsive design. By contrast, the individual, according to Buchler, “proceives nothing less than
[the] world, and nothing in particular. He functions in a universally available world individually
appropriated.”1 Therefore, proception is the means by which the individual lays claim to the
objective world, a process of appropriation that, I argue, necessitates creativity, even if it is
reflexive, and overall mirrors artistic endeavor. Proceptive appropriation and the creative process
can even be shown, in many cases, to be one and the same (or, at least, the two actions are at
times so tightly woven they are philosophically indeterminate as separate units).
Buchler stresses that there is a distinction “between the objective relation which issues in
inarticulate feeling and the objective relation which issues in judgment.”2 This means that, at its
most basic level, judgment makes it possible for the world to either be proceived or remain
unproceived, and is thus distinguished from perception in that judgment fundamentally requires
more than simple awareness—it demands a modifying action from the proceiver. But how,
exactly, we make this distinction in art-making is of special interest to what I call proceptivism.
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If we are to consider proception as a necessity of the creative process, along with
proception as part and parcel of human judgment, then so too is the creative process crucial to
judgment. In other words, proception, judgment, and creativity are all interdependent with one
another. Hence, it is vital to the task of proceptivism to not only illuminate the junction that
connects proception to creativity, but also with art and judgment. In this chapter, I first approach
this endeavor by delving into review on the core philosophical components that Buchler uses to
investigate this particular interplay, and discuss their relation to art-making. These components
include: query, validation, and communication.
Query
A project is a procept that is represented as an “element" in a “sign-complex,” yet it is the
result of reflexive communication, that presupposes social communication which it “imports”
into individual process.3 A product of query, however, is what emerges from an application of
query to project. The project’s outcome as a “product of query” refers to its social or
communicative availability, hence the product of a work of art, such as a finished painting.
Buchler writes that the products of query “comprise the judgments of the arts and of the sciences,
and in general all judgments that emanate from deliberative invention.”4 The products of query,
therefore, must be communicable, even though they stem from reflexive efforts. Or simply put,
the products of query are expressive and inventive.
To clarify, the theory of human judgment offers the term query to refer to the transition
of project into product, from what is potentially communicative to being communicative. Query
is an “evolution”5 that is defined by Buchler as a “process of planning”6 which drives human
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invention. The compulsion of query is thus distinctive in the sense that human invention is
propelled via a creator who is also a planner, and that “planless creation is purposeless
creation.”7 Of course, it is not difficult to hear an artist object to this notion, particularly those
who engage in automatism, stream-of-consciousness, or any form of improvisation. To be fair,
such impulses in art are indeed not without purpose. However, in keeping with Buchler’s theory,
neither are these impulses planless. Buchler emphasizes that artistic query, in particular, “takes
the forms of both overt and reflexive experimentation.”8 Plans, therefore, can operate reflexively,
perhaps even without the direct awareness of the artist (just as a procept does not require direct
awareness of the proceiver), only that it modifies the proceptive direction (yet can be made
apparent through the process of artistic invention). Moreover, whether overt or reflexive, artistic
query functionally remains as the “deliberative manipulation”9 of artistic events by an active
artistic agent.10 The notes played during musical improvisation, for example, likely follow
specific parameters of explorations that dictate a vein of imagination. In contrast, without
structure, the music crumbles into noise or discordance. The reflexive output hence demands the
ordered craft of the artist. Thus, what appears as impulse is nevertheless the product of direct
manipulation and planful experimentation.
The compulsion of query is likely distinct. However, Buchler does not directly provide a
label to his meager descriptions of compulsion in query. Yet, I argue, as is the case (at least) with
art, the compulsion of query is what Buchler offers elsewhere as logical compulsion, or “the
compulsion imposed by the laws of logic.”11 Buchler explains that logical compulsion is “the
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elemental framework within which proception and communication occur.”12 Though Buchler
stresses that commitment is essential to logical compulsion; for the proceiver to be “committed to
a course of reasoning.”13 Because reasoning is crucial to a “process of planning,” we may then
assume that commitment is likewise paramount to following an artistic framework. In other
words, the “process of planning” in art occurs within a framework that by nature demands
commitment. Whether the artistic effort is overt or reflexive, without planning there is neither
structure nor true commitment. Buchler has thus, in effect, drawn a bold line that connects
artistic commitment and artistic structure. In addition, Buchler states that “the laws of logic
exercise the most basic compulsion” and are themselves the necessary “conditions of
conceivability.”14 In this way, Buchler has also offered (albeit indirectly) that, by means of
logical compulsion, a project evolves into product via the individual’s conceptual action, which
is again evidential of commitment and planning. The artist cannot produce, be it overtly or
reflexively, without conceiving, which is itself a process logically compelled. An artistic product,
therefore, must be conceivable even if, as procept, it does not inherently require the direct
awareness of the artist. The procept is rather expressed as artistic product and is thereby
conceivable within the artist’s proceptive direction.
If we are to further apply logical compulsion to the action of transforming project into
product (i.e., query), we must then consider the philosophical significance of what an artistic
product is. Later in this chapter, I describe artistic products (along with other products of
proception) as issuing from human judgment, but emerging more specifically from what Buchler
often refers to as “utterance.” For the time being, however, it is important to highlight a
connection between product and meaning. An artistic product, having transformed from project
12
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and thereby following an artistic framework (or a “process of planning” driven by logical
compulsion), like any product of proception, is also an utterance, and thus has meaning. Yet,
again, according to Buchler, query in art is dependent on commitment; therefore, by the same
token, artistic meaning must also be contingent on the commitment of the artist. Buchler writes
that “when we ‘mean’ we express and reflect a commitment… which a product mirrors.”15 By
this logic, then, art without commitment has no meaning.
Validation in art
While commitment in art is certainly crucial to meaningful expression, still to be
determined is whether or not this expression is valid. As discussed prior, artistic invention occurs
within the proceptive domain. However, art’s production requires validation by some form of
completion, because the products of art are born of human judgment. According to Buchler’s
theory of human judgment, it’s possible that “for any judgment some validating perspective can
be determined or defined.”16 In other words, we assert a judgment as valid when we recognize
that it is final, in a relative sense, and that it no longer requires manipulation.17 But this relative
finality does not deny art-making as a creative process, or that the vast majority of art’s effort
takes place outside of what is exhibited as a final product. Rather, I would like to emphasize the
use of the word “relative.” When a product has “relative finality”18 that does not mean it is the
same as a static, unmalleable object. Instead, such a product is only final relative to a greater
complex. Buchler writes:
“Artistic practice validates its exhibitive judgments by determining and redetermining
their order in more complex products… This conception embraces collaborative as well

15

Ibid., 135.
Ibid., 159.
17
Ibid., 150.
18
Ibid.
16

48

as strictly ‘individual’ invention. What is important is the uniqueness of exhibitive query
and the exhibitive perspective.”19
The value Buchler attaches to “uniqueness” in this statement stems from the view that product is
distinguishable from the maelstrom of process—query that is necessarily exhibitive if its
products are to be validated. Furthermore, what is “unique” is not able to be copied, or at least
not finally or absolutely. This is particularly true for art-making:
“For the artist the perspective that generates a particular judgment is an induplicable
order… A work of art, then, may be said most properly to be validated by its creator (or
creators) in the process of its creation and enunciation. This process of (exhibitive)
validation occurs in the kind of perspective that is assimilable but not duplicable.”20
Buchler has thus posited that validation in art is ultimately free of fixity. While validation in art
is distinguishable and unique, he asserts that it is also assimilable and absorbable. In addition,
Buchler shows that validation in art may emerge from the creative process (so long as it is an
exhibitive query) but is simultaneously not isolated, or ultimately separate from the creative
process.
Buchler also points out that “artistic invention is, at the very least, a temporal process;”21
though it is not bound to a specific limit of time. By this vein, validation may be either enduring
or ephemeral (a momentary articulation in process, or an ingredient of “liveness” in process) and
so is entirely flexible. If we put this in terms of proceptivism, artistic product and artistic process
are by no means mutually exclusive and in fact appear to not only coexist but function as
symbiotic and simultaneous aspects of creation. In addition, art-making as a process within the
proceptive domain depends, holistically, on the validation of its products, for these are
19
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themselves a complex. Buchler expresses that the proceptive domain is in many ways a complex
of “obligations to validate.”22 What Buchler is suggesting here is that to validate is even itself
born out of process. Transcribed to art-making, we can therefore begin to understand validation
as an integral part of the creative process.
Let’s return for a moment to the idea of completion. I have discussed how, according to
Buchler’s theory of human judgment, completion is a judgment that is valid, and likewise a valid
judgment is one that is complete. They are two sides of the same coin. Completion is also that
which no longer demands manipulation, nor is it duplicable (i.e., it is unique). Moreover, the
finality of completion is only relative to a greater complex, whereby it is integral to an exhibitive
process. In light of proceptivism, art-making can thus also be seen as a process of validation,
whose products posses relative finality in that they are distinguishable from the creative process.
Yet artistic products also offer a somewhat novel exploration into validation that may further
build on Buchler’s postulations. That is, a look at the exhibitive function of artistic products with
regard to validation raises the question of whether or not the individual artist can validate a
product as final—succinctly put, the answer appears to be both yes and no, concurrently.
As we’ve already established, judgments are shown or exhibited before they are
compelled toward validation and completion. Hence, artistic “obligations to validate” must be
the products of a creative process that are then revealed within an exhibitive space. Therefore, to
ask if a sole artist can validate a product on their own, we need to first consider whether an
exhibitive space can be exclusive to the individual. In other words, is it possible for a product of
art to be singularly exhibitive to its art-maker? However, judgments or products are not
automatically valid or final; they require the review of a proceiver, and, according to Buchler,
there are certain conditions that make the product eligible for review. (Let me stress that these
22
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conditions are not what constitutes completion or validity but are what makes a product
reviewable for the proceiver in order to determine or deny completion/validity). Specifically,
products must be “understandable vehicles by which attention is focused and query simplified.”23
A product must be coherent, noticeable, and present its most basic query (i.e., the process of a
product’s “evolution from project”24). Thus our question is yet again transformed: we must ask if
these conditions are reviewable by the artist alone. Certainly, Buchler contends that a community
of proceivers (which is composed of at least two proceivers) is able to review a product, as well
further determine validity.25 But if the artist is solitary with their efforts toward validation, it then
follows that the most basic requirement for the individual would be, at least initially, to
recognize these conditions.
Clearly, it is no leap of the imagination to suggest that the individual artist is fully
capable of finding their own product coherent. Moreover, perceiving the simple query of a
product would then be predicated on an intimate knowledge of the creative process behind the
product, which the artist would no doubt possess. However, whether the artist notices the product
is not so clear. The products of art issue from the artist’s reflexive community, so if there is no
community present, then products could remain obscured by the ambiguity of process. Hence,
there can be no vacuum that keeps the artist wholly separate, and likewise no artist works alone.
Despite the logic of this argument, I find that it actually does more to support the
opposite view. If the artist is operating always in a reflexive community then it follows that the
artist is reflexive of community, and thus can offer the same attentions. Buchler’s statement that
“each successive enterprise of articulation critically aroused by a work of art is a step in its
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validation,”26 must function also for the individual. Essentially, the artist is capable of being their
own critic. Buchler continues: “the validity of a work of art lies in the extent to which it modifies
human query,” but this is “not to be confused with ‘social approval.’”27 That is to say, validation
in art is not inherently the same as an attempt to propitiate an audience but rather to stimulate
query, which I argue may function on an individual level.
Buchler provides some wiggle room here; wherein the ability to gauge the products of art
(or even an entire “work of art”) in terms of influence on further query (a continuance of
process) is potentially also in the hands of the singular artist, since the artist does not require
outward societal acceptance. However, Buchler does not omit society with his statement; he
simply disregards “social approval.” As such, Buchler is still implying community involvement,
so how then can the individual artist operate as self-validator? As mentioned earlier, community
may consist of two or more proceivers but it can also be reflexive, and this aspect can function
on the individual level. That is to say, the reflexive community is more than just represented by
the individual, the reflexive community can actually operate within the individual. Although, this
does not mean that the artist modifies in total isolation, for we have established that there exists
no vacuum; the individual is so inextricably tangled with community that, even at its most distant
point, it remains reflexive. Considering such a capacity for community, and Buchler’s standard
for validity in art, the modification of the singular artist’s query must, then, simultaneously occur
for a community.
In sum, the individual artist can in fact validate a product as final, but as an isolate the
artist cannot. What is required in all cases of validation is community—a truly isolated artist is
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an oxymoron, or at best a hypothetical entity and not actual.28 Community is composed of
multiple proceivers, but we have seen that the individual can at least function as community
reflexively, and so by this particular avenue the artist is capable of validating products as final.
In the next chapter I will revisit validation specifically in regard to dance as a communicatory
movement along some proceptive direction, and as “a process of appraisal”29 that is of reflexive
community. But for the remainder of this section, I draw further attention to the concept of
compulsion (which is necessary to discuss in order to investigate any principle of proceptivism).
According to Buchler, any proceptive discovery of the proceiver is fulfilled by judgment
or utterance, but it is articulation that truly realizes an utterance.30 We can view this realization
as an expression. And as articulation is defined by Buchler as the manipulation of the subjects of
communication,31 then each expression is up for validation—it becomes valid, says Buchler,
once it requires no further manipulation.32 In this way, it is easy to see how the artist may
validate through artistic expression. And considering the constant pressure of validation upon
expression, then it must follow that the individual artist is ever-compelled not only to articulate
but to validate their work, even via reflexive community.
In addition, Buchler asserts that “articulation is an imperative of life and of expression.”33
If we are to accept this statement as true, then validation becomes not just an extension of
articulation or communication, but akin to a vital life function of the individual. Hence,
validation is, at the very least, a crucial motivation behind any artistic endeavor. This type of
compulsion Buchler describes eloquently:
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“The individual, then, is not ‘entitled’ to whatever he utters. He must substantiate; he
must validate or render secure the products that emanate from his own perspectives. He
must define and discover his proceptive commitments and accept as data of validation the
critical query of others who may share some part of the same perspective.”34
While Buchler recognizes that validation does not occur in total isolation, the community he has
alluded to with this description can, as we’ve seen, be inclusive of the reflexive community, and
thereby operate on the individual level. However, the individual’s “active judgments cannot all
relate to him as their sole subject; and his desires and preferences remain to be articulated by a
process of communication that transcends his own visible intent.”35 In other words, Buchler
resounds that what is crucial to the validation of an individual’s utterance is articulation or
communication. Therefore, if communication is vital to validation, then it is so for life. By this
definition, it can be said that the communication and subsequent validation of an individual’s
utterance is a matter of life and death. Granted, not every utterance is articulated, and not every
expression, though subject to validation, becomes validated. But it is the drive toward validation
that is necessary, and having at least some general success in validation is required, which offers
a great force of compulsion for the individual. For the artist, specifically, I will discuss this
compulsion in terms of evidential compulsion. Although Buchler claims that art is not
evidentially compulsive, I assert otherwise—partially on the grounds of multiple inconsistencies
in Buchler’s argument, and primarily that art appears, quite conspicuously, to fall in line with
Buchler’s own requirements for evidential compulsion.
For clarification, we articulate judgments that are necessarily validated, but not every
utterance need be validated. Rather, there is a recurring output of validation that emerges from
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the storm of judgment. “Storm” is a good metaphor: like rain, only a partial amount of the water
that is held by the clouds falls to the ground. When rain ceases a desert may form; when there is
no output of validation from the individual, it is in a dreamless state of existence, a coma, or
death. The artist, therefore, ever-capitulates to the compulsion to communicate and to validate
with the same vigor of what compels life, but the artist need not succeed at every turn. Without
any artistic validation the artist is no longer an artist, and without any validation at all the
individual is no longer an individual. While the artist may not be the “sole subject” of judgment,
as Buchler states, the artist individually may be reflexive and so communicate reflexively. In
other words, the artist makes it possible to talk to oneself. The creative process of art, in this
way, is to communicate with the self, whereas the self constitutes reflexive community and
experience—the artist talks to “I,” but always to the community therein, and likewise validates in
this way.
Any datum of validation the individual may receive transcends their “visible intent,”
being that the intention remains to be validated by a process of communication, and that the facevalue of intention could very well be a byproduct of utterance that goes to the wayside as
judgment is validated (just as the intention of any message, for example, can be misinterpreted
even if it is understood as coherent). Moreover, an intention may even be understood but seen as
insignificant to the coherency of the message or unimportant in a certain context. Simply put, the
individual’s intention is subject to contextual value. For the artist, however, it may be somewhat
different, as artistic communication is potentially more directly abstract (i.e., an abstract
representation of utterance or proception serving as artistic expression), and so intention is also
interpreted by abstract means. Therefore, the data of validation is likewise abstract, and what is
“visible” with intention does not necessarily apply, since what is abstract is non-linear. Rather,
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the artist seeks to discover evidence of what compels them to communicate, and via validation
can reveal intention through an abstract lens. Furthermore, the abstract form of intention in art is
particularly uncorrupted if it is validated reflexively by the individual (and it is the reflexive act
that begets the artist’s creation). As the reflexive act is necessarily communicative, intention is
thus part and parcel of the individual artist’s process of validation.
What is evidential for the artist, including the reveal of intention, comes from a
compulsion that we may understand as a proceptive realization, evidenced by the data of
validation. According to Buchler, the compulsion of art lies in its effect on proception,36 and so a
proceptive realization is also, for the artist, a self-discovery made through the creative process.
Moreover, Buchler posits that what is needed in art is a “proceptive modification,”37 suggesting
that art literally makes manifest the “self-in-process,” and thereby evinces what I described
earlier as self-aligning modification of other. Requisite to evidential compulsion, however, is not
crude modification but what Buchler calls adjustive manipulation, meaning that proceptive
modification involves “a necessary condition of adaptation, exploration, and control” that leads
to an “experimental decision.”38
While Buchler does not hold the opinion that art is experimental in this way, he does
offer that “what we call ‘evidence’ compels by defining the adjustive limits of human action.”39
What Buchler has missed, however, is that the creative process for the artist functions entirely on
these very principles of experimentation—we are constantly defining the limits of human action.
Without experimentation there is no craft, and all craft originates in experimentation. For
example, a string plucked may produce a sound; through experimentation we bring this sound
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out of ambiguity and into the distinctions of notes, resonance, harmony, and eventually music
(which itself is continually redefined and compelled by the limits of action that composers and
musician discover through their creative process). Music, in turn, heavily influences proception
(can a non-deaf person think of life without it?). Therefore, the process of art-making both
exposes and affects proception, and the measure of which is evidentially compulsive by the
limits of human action.
It could be that Buchler sees art as a speculative manipulation of abstraction in the same
way that he views some aspects of science. Buchler describes mathematics, for instance, as a
“symbolic manipulation which is non-adjustive in character and which moves in the direction of
increasing abstraction.”40 Granted, art, similar to math, is symbolic, abstract, and perpetuates
abstraction. But, unlike math, art does not lack measurable action (what is needed for Buchler to
consider manipulation adjustive). In art, we make the abstract visible, or tangible; it is not a
straightforward calculation. That said, I certainly do not wish to disparage math, only to point out
that math is not, in this context, a true cognate for art.41
To be fair, Buchler also shies away from adjustive manipulation when it comes to
compulsion in philosophy, again emphasizing abstraction. He states that philosophy “defines
individuality and proception by aiming at the utmost in abstractness,”42 and so I assume he is
relating art, in this capacity, to philosophy, albeit indirectly. However, like with art and
mathematics, artistic compulsion and philosophic compulsion are likely more distanced than
Buchler is acknowledging. It may be true that artists apply philosophic thought to the most
abstract forms of expression. But abstraction in art finds itself within a set of parameters that
40
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become distinguished through experimentation that balances fact with idea. To borrow again
from the example of music, an improvisation explores within the strict confines of key, or else
risks dissonance.
Buchler insists experimental parameters as the arena for adjustment, explaining that
experiment is the process of “adjusting a given relation between ideas and facts,”43 yet I do not
see these conditions as exclusionary of art, just the contrary. With art, we make the experimental
process manifest. To illustrate, I’ll return to my example with music: ideas, whether linear in
fashion or wholly abstract, are tested within the constraints of facts, or the physical limits of
sound, pitch, rhythm, etc. Without these facts, music would melt into a puddle of incoherent
sound, perhaps not even discernable as noise. Facts make art possible, so that the creative
process functions like a controlled experiment that defines the limits of action, and surely, there
is action in art. For example, proceptive modification particular to human action can also be
taken literally as human movement, and so can easily be applied to dance.
In brief, proceptive modification is adjustive in that it defines the limits of human action,
stemming from experimentation. Art meets these requirements, and offers self-discovery, though
Buchler gives contradictory examples of adjustive manipulation and, as I have shown, either
unfairly excludes art or admits to not knowing where to place its compulsion. However,
compulsion by the process of “adaption, exploration, and control” would not be possible without
procepts—indeed, procepts are the metaphysical substance that compose Buchler’s notion of
experimentation, and I assert that it is also the case for art. That said, I should return for a
moment to an explanation on procepts.
I am sitting in my poorly ventilated office, looking at an orange I will eventually reward
myself with for having made progress on my writing. My relationship with the object, with the
43
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orange, is my “experience” of the orange, indelibly imbued with my understanding and
perception of the orange. Yet more so: the orange is my process of the orange, by which I modify
the orange in relation to myself, and thus can be seen as a unit of my proception. In other words,
the orange is itself object, but in relation to my proception of the orange it is procept. The
process by which I adapt the orange as procept (my aforementioned relationship to it) is the
subject of interest to the artist, because the process of adaptation is by nature a creative process,
which would imply that proception inherently is the creative process. That is to say, our
“experience” (i.e., our proception) is founded on our creativity (or, at the very least, proception is
so interdependent with the creative process that they are philosophically indistinguishable from
one another). Perhaps this is the reason why Buchler stumbles on categorizing or defining
compulsion in art and, for the most part, leaves art alone save for a philosophically isolated
treatment of poetry (although he does, sparingly, allow ideas on art to seep through the cracks of
his general theory).
Buchler’s ignorance of the artist’s process is further shown in his contention that, because
art is “exhibitive and not assertive,” the idea of evidence in art is “irrelevant.”44 He goes on to
say that the validation art seeks is “open and unlimited, ever more determinate through the
growth of reflexive and social communication.”45 Yet, does not Buchler’s own reference to the
reflexive quality of art imply the individual? If so, why then would the individual not be the
individual artist? It seems again that Buchler breezes past the fact that the individual artist
creates. That is to say, art is more than simply exhibitive; it is an act of creation. It is true,
however, that art has an indefinite potential that may appear to non-artists as “open and
unlimited,” but art operates within relative constraints and is produced via defined limits; thus its
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manipulation meets the requirement of being adjustive. These limits are obviously capable of
being redefined, reshaped, or shifted, and so art is able to retain its indefinite quality. But that
does not mean art is not compelled by means of proceptive modification or experimentation (i.e.,
evidential compulsion).
Even considering, for sake of argument, the pure exhibitive effects of artistic product,
Buchler nonetheless fails to provide a sound definition for art’s compulsion. For example, while
admitting that the products of art directly modify proception (which is itself a contradiction), he
offers only a weak and wholly vague allusion to compulsion in art. In his seminal work
judgment, Buchler writes “there is a mode of compulsion distinctive of art as art,”46 and leaves it
at that. However, though he stumbles over compulsion in art, and turns a blind eye to the creative
process, his notions on evidential compulsion, I have argued, ironically provide an excellent
definition.
Buchler also puts forward that art affects the individual’s qualitative life and responses,47
which of course contradicts his assertion that art is non-adjustive, for how can art not define the
proceiver’s limits of manipulation if it has an incremental, and so measurable, effect on the
individual? Moreover, he appears to be speaking about the audience and not the artist. Being
himself a philosopher and not an artist, Buchler makes the obvious mistake of ignoring the
process of the creative individual, and instead focuses on the product of art functioning in society
(which is, at best, half the picture).
Another contradiction arises when Buchler propounds that art compels only by
establishing a different sort of realization in the proceiver.48 To elucidate, Buchler says that the
individual comes to “understand more, not necessarily in the sense that he ‘learns more about
46
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himself’ or that he grasps new ‘facts,’ but in the sense that the augmentation of his judgment
widens his power of assimilation.”49 So, we see that the proceptive modification for the proceiver
is integral to realization. He writes also that the individual “comes either to sense or to utilize a
qualitative modification in his relation to the work of art, or a qualitative gain in his proceptive
direction.”50 Yet again, Buchler’s response is very product driven over process and overlooks the
complex workings and process of the artist. Moreover, it seems unlikely that a qualitative gain in
proceptive direction can occur without the adaption or proceptive modification of the proceiver,
nor a qualitative modification without “exploration and control.” That is not to deny a possible
emphasis in art that deals with self-discovery within the proceptive direction. But this sort of
product of art (or the spectatorial output) is only the tip of the iceberg, and the creative process
utilizes a deep compulsion that is at least evidential.
Communication
The artist communicates, and while a community of two or more proceivers is requisite
to communication, I have shown that this may also occur on an individual level (if done
reflexively). Additionally, it is likely that the act of artistic creation “begins” reflexively (or is so,
at minimum, for the individual artist). I have also pointed out that Buchler does not generally
consider the creative process of the individual artist but instead attends, almost exclusively, to
the products of art. Buchler also ignores the creative process when referring to reflexive
communication in art. For instance, he writes that the effectiveness of a work of art is the extent
of which the artistic product “dominates reflexive communication” and “is measurable by the
degree… it pervades communication… and influences the subsequent character of
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communication and invention.”51 Of course, being that it is reflexive, the “character of
communication and invention” can certainly also apply to the individual creator. Thus, in this
way, Buchler indirectly addresses the artist and also alludes to spectatorship in art. However, the
question remains as to what other modes of communication art utilizes, and to directly review
these modes in terms of proception.
Again, Buchler does not fully address the individual artist or the creative process, but I
endeavor to fill his oversight by exploring the modes of communication in art. To begin, one
mode of communication Buchler recognizes in his theory on human judgment is asymmetrical
communication. He explains that asymmetrical communication in art “is best understood through
its influence on subsequent communication, which is necessarily reflexive and possibly social.”52
With artworks in general, “any context is itself subject to the same degree of interpretive latitude
as its ingredients.”53 That is to say, the signs of an artwork are ambiguous until made
determinable according to an applied context. Therefore, the effect a work of art has on later
communications, be they reflexive or purely social, occur asymmetrically, or out of direct
context. This is like removing (either conceptually or physically) an artifact from its in situ
placement, and then measuring its influence out of cultural context. The pyramids of Giza, for
example, have extraordinary influence on subsequent communications, though few are
symmetrical with its original context; the US dollar bill would surely make little sense to one of
the pharaohs.
The signs of art, however, are not fixed units since the information a sign contains is
subject to its contextual packaging. Because of this, Buchler asserts that art does not deliver a
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solid message; or in his words, “a product of art does not communicate unequivocally.”54
However, neither is art completely ambiguous. Buchler writes:
“It is inept to say that the sign-components of artistic products… are “ambiguous”…
[because] the import of an ambiguous sign depends upon its context. When a context is
specified or identified, the sign becomes determinate.”55
Signs or products in art are only ambiguous if understood as isolates. Yet, as is the case with the
individual, no sign can exist in a vacuum; its existence depends on contextual housing, just as the
artist requires community (albeit the artist may function to some extent reflexively). But also, the
sign does not totally shed its theoretically ambiguous nature, for its determinate context is
flexible, just as water may fill various vessels to their shape.56 That is to say, the products of art
are adopted and perpetuated proceptively by the spectator, though outside of the intended artistic
context. The artist “communicates asymmetrically with the spectator by contributing new
elements for proceptive assimilation and manipulation.”57
While Buchler’s ideas on asymmetrical communication in art appear to have a strong
relationship with the spectator-response to a complete and exhibited work, he does hint,
somewhat, at the creative process behind the finished product. Buchler says that communication
in art “is a continuous process, not an instantaneous impact,”58 meaning that products in art are
not only fluid and flexible (though determinable via context) but also are persistently applied to
new contexts and to various interpretations, hence their asymmetrical latitude. However, Buchler
points out that the proceptive response can also itself become an art.59 In other words, the
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asymmetrical latitude of artistic communication is a fertile process that transforms fluid signs
into more determinable ones. Therefore, a “continuous process” for Buchler may also imply the
process that comes before the actual product of art, and thus hints at the creative process.
Proceptivism will build on this assumption, whole-heartedly.
The process of communication discussed here should not be confused with criticism.
Criticism does appeal to the perpetuating nature of artistic signs and communication but,
according to Buchler, criticism does not manipulate context. He writes that while criticism may
be composed of the products of communication, it nevertheless does not adjudicate the “destiny”
of these products, which may be sustained in communication or short-lived regardless of whether
or not they are “nurtured” by criticism.60 It is important to note also that, while artistic
communication is “continuous,” this can be interpreted more as indefinite rather than infinite. In
other words, artistic products may extend into the community indefinitely (via a social,
symmetrical, asymmetrical, or critical conduit), yet this circuit will, eventually, reach its
terminus. Buchler describes:
“Some products are exposed at birth, others nurtured... But some exposed products thrive
and continue to communicate, while others, though nurtured, fail to sustain their
communicative force.”61
This does not mean the artistic product loses influence. The artistic product may inevitably
ricochet into the social abyss, though at that point it does not do so as product but as energy.
Buchler describes this fate as the product “exposed;” which is to say, each product, though flung
into indefinite motion, nevertheless has a certain potential for duration, even if that duration
cannot be precisely predicted.
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What may (at least partially) predict duration, however, is the mode of artistic
communication in which the product is delivered: if the product is communicated
asymmetrically, it is likely to have a greater distance from its artistic context. The communicative
demand between proceivers in asymmetrical communication thus cannot be mutual, and is most
likely to involve a non-participatory spectator. “Communicative demand” is defined by Buchler
as an implicit need for “articulation in the form of products,” or, “manifestations of
proception.”62 Therefore, the artistic products delivered by asymmetrical communication may
possess an inherently short lifespan. Asymmetrical communication, in this manner, is also farther
removed from the creative process, and so possibly only offers the tip of the iceberg in terms of
information. However, asymmetrical communication in art, by these means, does provide the
greatest opportunity for criticism, since the critic typically operates outside of the artistic creative
process.
By contrast, symmetrical communication makes mutual demand among the proceivers
involved, or a “joint manipulation and assimilation of signs correlated with the dominant
procept.”63 With the proceivers involved symmetrically, Buchler explains that they must also be
a procept of each other (though this does not mean percept, since we may communicate with the
signs of the individual without direct awareness or attachment to the individual).64 Rather, what
is essential is that the products of communication be “part of a larger and more persistent order
of communication.”65 If the proceiver-procept communicates with another proceiver-procept,
engaged by mutual demand, there is potential for the whole self to be represented (which is itself,
by definition, an act of proception). An instance of communication, then, “may have no
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situational locus of any lesser scope than that of the self in its total career.”66 Therefore, if we are
to understand symmetrical communication in terms artistic communication, it follows that
symmetry may offer the best mode for proceptivism to function. Moreover, symmetrical
communication is perhaps the greatest opportunity for artist-to-artist exchange, provided they
make mutual communicative demands and are procepts of each other. While an in-depth
exploration of artistic collaboration in proceptivism is beyond the scope of this study, and
Buchler does not speak much about cocreating art,67 I believe it is worth further investigation
through the lens of a symmetrical endeavor.
Another important factor to cover concerning communication in art is what function it
serves with regard to proception. When it comes to communication in general, Buchler claims
that it is “at least a process of transmission.”68 If we accept that transmission is the basic function
of communication, I see no reason why the function of communication in art should differ from
its broader purpose. It may be that Buchler agrees. He writes that what art “communicates
depends on human receptivity,”69 which overtly implies a transmission was made. Taking into
account the emphasis that both Buchler and I have made on community as a critical aspect of
communication, transmission therefore necessitates reception—the only question being if this
reception further perpetuates the artistic product, and if it does so symmetrically or
asymmetrically. Yet, how might we further describe this product in terms of proceptivism?
A community has been operationally defined as consisting of two or more proceivers, and
what binds community together we have seen as, most essentially, communication. The
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communication that occurs can act socially or reflexively, and functions either symmetrically or
asymmetrically, but in all cases, communication transmits a product between proceivers. With at
least symmetrical communication, proceivers must be procepts of one another, which thus
presents obvious potential for the product being transmitted to also be a procept. However,
considering that community requires multiple proceivers, and that proceiving is, so to speak, a
verb, it seems safe to say that the products we transmit and receive must be procepts. It is
unlikely a coincidence, then, that Buchler propounds that an utterance is a procept, since
products are born from communicative articulations. With this in mind, it is not surprising that
he chooses the word utterance as a synonym for judgment.
The challenge raised here is for proceptivism to describe what is done with artistic
utterances (articulation). How do we highlight the way judgments in art are utilized by the
creative process? Logically, this endeavor might, first and foremost, consider the perspective
offered by a work of art, since, according to Buchler, perspective is interdependent with
utterance. Furthermore, Buchler asserts that in a work of art a perspective is “the amplification of
the judgment,”70 meaning that judgment is amplified as articulation—it is an utterance particular
to artistic expression. However, it is questionable whether such articulation can be owned solely
by the individual. In other words, can a perspective in a work of art be peculiar to the singular
artist?
The short answer is yes and no. While Buchler makes the claim that this amplification
“requires collaborative assent by the spectator,”71 which implies validation, it makes little sense
why this cannot occur reflexively. Just as the artist may validate independent of a proximate
community by means of reflexive communication, the perspective is obligated to operate in
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communication yet is likewise capable of being reflexive. In addition, Buchler stresses that the
“perspective as a whole… must be regarded as a judgment-complex,”72 which suggests that the
entirety of perspective in a work of art is composed of a network of perspectives that of course
can be sourced from multiple proceivers. Granted, this network may be wholly reflexive, but if
utterances underly perspective then it is necessary of a work of art to be inclusive of community,
albeit at least reflexively. In this manner, one could say that no art is made without performance,
for the spectator is always within.
Buchler does not delineate on amplification in the art-making process but, rather, limits
his discussion to a work of art. While proceptivism has recognized the finitude of products of art,
it questions the finished quality of a so-called “work of art.” Though products of art may be
discernable as relatable units, it is trickier to isolate a specific “work,” especially if what is
exhibited as a “work of art” only represents a small portion of the art-making process. Granted,
elements or products of artistic efforts are certainly performative and therefore might collectively
enter an arena in which spectators could view them as “complete.” Nevertheless, there is a
distinct difference between completion and presentation. In other words, there does not seem to
be a point where the “work” is not a working, and this working only stops when the artist
diverges from a particular set of efforts to new processes.
Although Buchler focuses on the exhibitive qualities of art, his concepts nevertheless
allow for a discussion of process, which he hints at. Buchler states: “a work of art is not simply
an aggregate of judgments but an order of interrelated judgments.”73 This can only mean that in
the art-making process we are locating the product of utterance as it issues forth in proception.
Thus, the idea that art’s judgments are “interrelated” suggests an enmeshment which tangles the

72
73

Ibid., 122.
Ibid.

68

notion of a “finished work,” and so can surely be taken as acknowledgement of creative process
on the part of Buchler. Yet, he does not manage to break away from the spectatorial aspect,
writing that “the process of construction lays emphasis on ‘seeing’ the meaning and on ‘feeling’
the impact of the conceptual configuration.”74 Of course, as stated, art-work may not be capable
of functioning wholly outside an audience. However, the spectatorship that Buchler alludes to
has an obvious social connotation that art is not obliged to. What’s more, Buchler contradicts
himself since, as previously mentioned, he posits that community can reside in the artist—if this
be true, then can their art-work not communicate beyond what is typically social? The spectator
may always be present, but the spectator does not need to inhabit a purely social sphere. Instead,
the spectator can be completely reflexive; the spectator is within. Considering the reflexive
spectator, exhibition in art can therefore occur outside of what is directly social, and can even
take place with the singular presence of the artist, physically separate from others. Art, in this
way, is thus capable of being “anti-social.”
Artist, community, and spectator alike can be seen in this light as inevitable givens and
constants during the focused effort of creation. The question therefore arises if this creative
process can continue once the effort of the artist has concluded. According to Buchler, it can,
provided there exists an assimilation of the process that “demands of the potential assimilator
inferential and imaginative labor of a creative kind.”75 That it is to say, a continual process of artcommunication, which operates initially as both the artist and community (including spectator)
concurrently. The process can thus evolve creatively among spectators minus the originating
artist’s direct involvement or even knowledge of the continuing process.
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Could this continuance of the artist’s process be said to be more tangential than it is an
evolution? Could it rather be the emergence of new creative efforts and communications, wholly
separate from the artist’s own process? According to Buchler’s theory of human judgment, it
occurs as an act of elimination: the assimilator is necessarily a communicator of this process, but
may exclude products of the process which inhibit this continuing communication. Hence, by
“simply discarding those judgments which happen to impede the actual process of
communication,”76 the assimilator may eventually come to a point that is distinct from the
originating process. However, this tributary does not mean the main river ended the moment it
left the originating artist. Instead, the divergence represents the point at which the original
process concludes, which may or may not be contiguous with the moment the original artist
departs from the process. Moreover, the conclusion is not necessarily fixed—the creative process
can be continued at any point in time, so long as the judgments of the process remain
communicable.
In the next chapter, I take the issues detailed in chapter 3 that directly concern
proceptivism and begin to translate them toward a direct application to an artistic medium:
dance. This means that I move from the groundwork laid in this chapter of applying proception
and human judgment to the art question, and push forward into a narrowing focus on dance that I
hope exemplifies an overall justification for proceptivism.
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CHAPTER 4
DANCE AND APPLIED-PROCEPTIVISM

Proceptivism, applied directly to the context of art-making, can be seen as the process in
art that manifests a self-awareness of proception, which can then inform the act of artistic
creation and exploration. Proceptivism contends that the artist is capable of being informed by
the products of judgment, or those units that compose one’s proception. And it is thus the
proceptivist’s job to gaze into one’s reflection in that deep pool and drink—that is to say, the
artist’s goal is to express an intimate self-awareness of proception.
While proceptivism is a newly proposed addition to the philosophical theory of human
judgment, Buchler does intimate, most often indirectly, that art is an appropriate avenue toward
an investigation into proception. In the previous chapter, I forged a connection between
Buchler’s ideas on abstraction and experimentation to artistic investigations. Moreover, that the
explorations of art detect what does or does not occur in the proceptive domain, “not by simple
inspection but by a difficult process of abstraction.”1 However, to take this use of art one step
further, proceptivism puts forth the idea of dance as an exemplary medium, or what is potentially
the most convenient artistic application to the exploration of proception.
But why dance?
To begin, dance supplies proceptivism with embodied cognates for Buchler’s terms—an
embodiment that, I argue, can be connected to Laban Movement Analysis (LMA), a method and
language often used in dance and choreography to describe, interpret, and document movement.
Moreover, as dance employs the actual body of the proceiver, dance—as a conceptual
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embodiment of human judgment—is the most readily available instrument to the proceiver,
regardless of their preferred artistic discipline or even lack of artistic discipline.
When Buchler defines proception as the “process in which an individual’s whole self is
represented,”2 he is not suggesting a bigger or broader definition of self but referring to a
relationship representative of the self in active sum. Or, one could say, a holistic relationship.
However, a relationship is not static, it is a process that, by its indefinite degree of movement,
represents the whole individual. That is, the individual is both a cumulative identity and an
indefinite process. Therefore, the relationship becomes representative of the whole self in the
metaphysical digestive system of the individual—wherein the other (itself a process or natural
complex) is distinctively refined. In other words, the individual adapts the other according to
their subjective reality—there is objectivity, but it is proceived as relative. Meaning, in this way,
is the product of a subjective process, or a byproduct of proception. The other, in this context, is
referred to, in terms of proception, as a procept. It is, again, a relationship process. Moreover, the
procept is not just “other” but the product of what has been modified by utterance; though I
argue that judgment or utterance is only partly the modifier, because the transformation of object
to procept further requires movement within the proceptive domain.
In this chapter I detail what movement and utterance together means to the theory of
human judgment, and to proceptivism—specifically as it is seen in dance. In addition, I
investigate the overlap between concepts in the movement theory of LMA and those within
Buchler’s ideas on proception and judgment. I do this largely with the aid of evaluating an actual
work of choreography, one that I have personally been part of as a primary creator. Along the
way, I make connections to dance, including the fundamental assertion that proception requires
movement—and where there is expression and movement, there is dance.
2
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Movement is the crux of proception
The most salient reason for the emphasis of dance (among the arts) by proceptivism is the
fact that movement is the crux of proception. That is to say, the philosophical idea behind
proception depends, at its very core, on the movement of the proceiver. As mentioned in the
previous chapters, proceptive direction is crucial to the proceptive domain, and proceptive
direction requires movement. The individual proceives at the instant that the individual moves.
Moreover, the proceiver is, necessarily, a mover. Considering how crucial movement is to
proception, then it follows that movement is essential to any representation of the whole self. Or,
in Buchler’s own words, “the whole individual is the cumulative representation of the moving
individual.”3
It also follows, then, that self-actualization must occur in connection with the movement
of the proceiver. Self-actualization functions in much the same way as reflexive communication
actualizes reflexive community—the individual makes manifest the proceptive awareness
through an expression. The process of self-actualization can hence be described, in the simplest
terms, as self-reflective and self-expressive. Yet, the key point of logic here is that selfactualization demands movement. Buchler is quick to highlight this concept; his first mention of
“proception” states that “the term is designed to suggest a moving union of seeking and
receiving, of forward propulsion and patient absorption.”4 But aside from movement, Buchler is
also suggesting here that congruent to both reflexive-actualization and self-actualization is a
dependency on communication. In this way, general proceptive-actualization must communicate.
After all, communication is “the guiding mechanism of proception,”5 and as previously
mentioned, communication is a central aspect of art. Thus, if we are to accept dance as a form of
3
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art, then we also recognize that dance communicates. And if proceptive actualization equally
depends on movement and communication, dance thus offers both a fantastic model and an
opportunity for the proceiver to self-actualize.
Granted, while self-actualization entails proceptive movement, it arguably is not
restricted to literally physical movement. That is to say, proceptive movement may employ
(perhaps even first and foremost) intellectual movement. Dance, in this light, might then be
viewed as unnecessary or frivolous in regard to a direct application of proception and the theory
of human judgment. However, Buchler frequently emphasizes human “activity” in direct
connection to proception. For example, he writes: “proception is the composite, directed activity
of the individual.”6 I stress here the term “directed activity”—direction alone would imply
movement, but in relation to activity there seems to be little doubt that Buchler suggests here a
body in motion. Moreover, Buchler makes this comment as soon as he introduces the term
“proception,” which then implies that the detection of proception might only be done in
motion—that is, as a moving human body. This, at the very least, evokes the dancer, and so the
medium of dance is appropriately applicable to proception.
In addition, self-actualization, or what is evidently proceptive, requires one further step
beyond both movement and communication. Self-actualization also needs what Buchler refers to
as validation. In the last chapter, I explored the concept of validation as it relates to art. But,
according to Buchler’s theory, and most succinctly put, general “validation is justification,”7 and
operates by appraisal. Granted, at first glance, to suggest that self-actualization demands
validation might seem like an oxymoron. However, as discussed, part and parcel of selfactualization is communication; thus the proceptive self is transmitting a signal which remains to
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be justified by the proceiver’s community. Likewise, actualization is vital to community. In
Buchler’s own words, what is produced by human proception “as potential vehicles of
communication [stands] in need of a certain kind of actualization which [in turn] can never be
wholly achieved: they require to be validated.”8 Here, Buchler argues that validation and
actualization do more than just stipulate one another; rather, according to Buchler, validation and
actualization are concurrent, conjoined efforts that cannot be teased apart.
I have argued thus far that dance is suitable for proceptivism because movement is
necessary to proception. At the least, I posit that proceptive movement is inclusive of physical
movement. Furthermore, proceptive movement communicates. Clearly, dance fundamentally
achieves both movement and communication, and thereby self-actualizes. Although it now
remains to determine how dance can be an avenue for validation.
In our simplest understanding of dance as a performance art, we might assume some level
of spectatorship, and this assumption is often correct in the literal sense. Referring to Buchler’s
most basic illustration of community, there is the need for two proceivers. Spectatorship thus
offers, immediately, a community (and as such, a community wherein validation may occur).
However, Buchler also asserts that “the individual in himself constitutes a community, the
reflexive or proceptive community.”9 In other words, the individual is simultaneously both an
identifiable unit and community. It could be, then, that the dancer possesses the spectator, and
vice versa: perhaps Buchler’s “patient absorption” alludes to the community within; that the self
is both part of and stands apart from community, and hence is both “seeking and receiving”
communications. Through physical movement, the dancer may concomitantly signal and
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spectate. Therefore, by this mechanism, the dancer is given the opportunity to justify the
communication and consequently, in so doing, actualize.
How the dancer may justify communication is, in essence, validation, which Buchler
fundamentally describes as “a process of appraisal.”10 This process can be private, and in the
case of art, might always originate privately. According to Buchler’s theory, this is due to the
singularity of the artistic experience at the point of creation:
“Some perspectives, involving unique and possibly unrepeatable situations, may carry
with them unique appraisals relative to individuals. This is very likely the case in all of
artistic creation.”11
We can thus glean from this view that, even within cooperative artistic efforts, appraisal is, at the
very least, something that originates privately for the individual, at the onset of modification.
The individual artist can thus be considered the source of their own validation (though it is
necessary to note that a judgment unto itself, without a validator—be it the artist or anyone—
cannot self-validate, as this would suggest that the judgment needs no validation, which is
philosophically unsound).12
The concept has empowering potential for the artist and could be developed further to
celebrate the diverse nature of artistic endeavor. However, these judgments, though they are
private, also do not limit themselves from the broader scope of validation. Buchler suggests that
no “judgments which are private, are private in the sense that they are indescribable or
uninvestigable.”13 Artistic validation, though it may originate with the artist, is potentially
contiguous with both communication and investigation or query. After all, per Buchler, human
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expression “constitutes an utterance or judgment, and every utterance is subject to validation,
even if it be not actually validated.”14 The question remains as to the mechanisms by which
specifically dance accomplishes validation, both private and otherwise, and what modes of
investigation or query generally occur.
To begin to answer this question it is important to make distinctions in dance between
what Buchler sees as assertive, exhibitive, and active judgment. According to Buchler, assertive
judgments differ from exhibitive, most importantly, because “one judgment may compel another
evidentially,”15 and judgments possess an “indefinite number of implications.”16 While
previously I have argued that exhibitive judgment, at least as it concerns art, can be evidentially
compelled, the case can still be made that what is assertive is limited to a more linear
investigable scope than what is exhibitive. As I see it, this is because assertive judgment is
(perhaps counterintuitively) more demonstrative than what is exhibitive. That is to say, an
assertion essentially pushes forward a true/false binary,17 or it is directly descriptive, which holds
the potential to implicate further calculations based on evidence. Hence, though I have argued
that exhibitive judgment can be evidentially compelled, assertive judgment is fundamentally
evidentially compelled.18 This means that when an assertive judgment is validated privately it is
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not because it is unique, as may be the case with active or exhibitive judgment, but because it is
restricted.19
By contrast, while some products of art may be assertive in judgment, art is necessarily
active. Moreover, considering that judgment in art essentially communicates, then if we are to
accept that art (though at times assertive and/or exhibitive in judgment) is necessarily active,
then it follows that art always communicates. In addition, active judgments (as well as exhibitive
judgments) have “indefinite potentialities for further investigation, action, and assimilation.”20 It
appears, then, that action and investigation (or query) run parallel. Within this framework of
Buchler’s theory, we begin to view “art” as a verb. As such, it is not fanciful to consider dance as
exemplary of an active artform. That dance expresses with movement, is thereby manifest of
art’s essential mode of judgment; thus dance concurrently holds a fundamental potential for
investigation in its movement beyond private validation. This logic is resounded in Buchler’s
statement: “the proverb that actions can speak louder than words happens to be metaphysically
correct.”21 Hence, dance can operate along a network of metaphysical possibilities that arguably
other efforts more directed in assertive (or even exhibitive) judgment cannot, and dance likely
exemplifies the arts in this manner to a degree that is not as obvious elsewhere in the arts.22
If, as I have established, dance fundamentally investigates through its active judgment,
which is literally made manifest in action, then dance’s investigation logically must follow
particular constraints, or directed via certain conditions. But what general modes of investigation
does dance engage with? And how do these modalities navigate proceptive direction or domain
in terms of dance theory? To answer these questions, I will explore dance’s query in terms of
19
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LMA,23 highlighting the ways LMA ties to principles found in Buchler’s theory of human
judgment. Specifically, I will discuss dance’s potential in terms of LMA efforts, and use for this
exploration the review of a working example of my own work, a piece of choreography called
The Kiln. I will also look at conceptual overlaps in LMA and proceptive direction, as movement
within this sphere is crucial to any mode of query, and by extension proceptive domain. In
addition, subsequent to this look at LMA, I will address in this chapter dance as it concerns
Buchler’s notions on communication, spectatorship, meaning, and validation.
Rudolph Laban, a Hungarian dancer/choreographer and dance innovator who originated
LMA, emphasized in his writings the importance of exploring movement in terms of human
experience. As such, by extension, Laban’s ideas tie to proception, as proception is a continuance
in philosophical discussion on experience. His writings may predate Buchler’s coinage of
“proception,” yet Laban’s thoughts on human experience (specifically in the context of
movement) are essentially comparable to Buchler’s. For instance, Laban makes aware of the
communicative powers of movement:
“When we realise that movement is the essence of life, and that all expression… uses
movement as a vehicle, we cannot help seeing the importance of understanding this
outward expression of the living energy within.”24
It is certainly no leap to assume “expression” for Laban means communication.
Therefore, it is important to highlight here that Laban has attributed the fundamental quality of
communication to movement at the same time he recognized movement as essential to life. We
can easily interpret the statement, then, that movement for Laban is crucial to both human
communication and human experience. Moreover, Laban alludes to an internal process that
23
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approximates proception. For him, it is an “energy” that is understood via the “outward
expression.” Semantically, Buchler and Laban overlap, particularly if we supplement
“understanding” with “validation,” “outward” with “actualization,” and “expression” with
“communication.” Even if we take Laban’s “life” as a more metaphysical reference, it still
echoes Buchler who, as I have shown, demonstrates that movement is crucial to proception, and
in this way “the motive force of life.”25
Though sparsely mentioned, Buchler nods to the impetuses behind art, from which we
can extrapolate a moving individual. For instance, Buchler states that “the proceptive direction
determines the hunger… of art.”26 Clearly, direction can be taken to imply movement, just as
movement suggests direction. Though only in passing, Buchler has thus set up movement as the
core of artistic drive (which is also reflective of LMA). Further, he refers to the action of
judgment that, as previously discussed, is so essential to art. And so, later in this chapter, I will
also draw a parallel between this sense of direction found in the theory of human judgment and
that of direction in LMA.
But there exists an even more apparent similarity. According to dance scholar Sam
Thornton, Laban saw movement as more than just “a component of the chain which links man’s
inner activity and the world around him, for it is the medium through which he actualises his
responses.”27 Here, Thornton suggests that Laban uses, in effect, the same terminology as
Buchler, and it appears to also be semantically in the same context. By way of Laban, Thornton
essentially describes proceptive movement, and stresses the mover as integral to a reflexive
community. The study of movement for Laban was thus concerned with a person in relation to
the world, and particularly the individual’s relation to community, a concept expressed in his
25
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Reigenwerk or “round dance.”28 Moreover, in his writings Laban will often resound Buchler’s
own broad definition for proception, but in connection to creative effort. For example, Laban
states that “any creative and expressive activity demands the sustained effort of the whole
personality.”29
I would like to draw further attention to Laban in that, through action, he calls on us to
realize what Buchler would later term the “proceptive direction.” This “proceptive direction” is a
direct comparison to Laban’s kinespheric direction, limited by kinesphere, a limitation which I
liken to Buchler’s proceptive domain. Further, according to Buchler, the “way that an individual
will act at any time… depends on [their] proceptive direction.”30 The “will act” of this statement
implies that the dancer or mover must be cognizant of the impulses behind action. These
impulses, I argue, can be understood via Laban’s efforts.
When most people first hear of Laban’s “efforts,” they encounter his “eight efforts,” or
general types of effort behind human movement designed to capture the most basic character of
the movement. These efforts are known as float, flick, dab, punch, wring, press, slash, and glide.
These days, Laban’s eight efforts are often taught in the context of theatre, both as stage
movement and to transcribe that character of movement to the quality of voice and line
delivery.31 However, for this study, I will look instead to Laban’s effort drives. While the eight
efforts are certainly descriptive, they only hint at the impetuses that propel effort into movement,
as well as being prone to theatrical characterizations that would be more challenging to compare
in philosophic terms. In addition, I will spend some time with Laban’s effort factors which
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provide more detailed descriptors behind the effort of movement, and are more readily tied to
inner motives or drives of effort than the broad and exceedingly general eight effort types. In
both instances, I link effort to the propulsions behind art through the lens of proceptivism. To
make these associations more visible, I utilize a real-life example of a method used in a creative
project that I cocreated. As such, I explain our method in terms of LMA and the impetuses
behind movement, which I then relate to the impetuses behind art (i.e., proceptivism).
LMA- effort
The Kiln is an original work by the Ellensburg Dance Collective (EDC), commissioned
by Converge Dance Festival 2019, performed at Velocity Dance Center, Seattle. The Kiln was
crafted in the contemporary manner; meaning, the choreography was not intended to follow any
recognized convention. Rather, The Kiln was an experiment in dance movement that attempted
to venture into new territory within the medium whilst still accomplishing the artistic task of
telling a story—or in the least, conveying emotional content. This production and the methods
used to create it, as connected to LMA, serves as a working example of how dance makes the
creative process more visible in terms of the theory of human judgment, and to show that dance
can function as an exemplary model for understanding proceptivism in general. This process is
made more evident by the added metaphorical layer of ceramics, which demonstrates how the
creative process is resounded in human judgment regardless of the artistic medium.
The EDC’s primary undertaking in The Kiln was to explore the notion of what is
commonly referred to as a “formative experience,” operationally defined as an event that shapes
a recurring emotional pattern in the individual. To encapsulate the concept of a formative
experience via dance, the EDC used ceramics as a working metaphor, with clay acting as a
representation of the process of the emotional pattern being shaped. The fact that clay must
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eventually be fire-hardened in a kiln to retain form (i.e., a “trial by fire”) gave the EDC the
title The Kiln and it’s focus.
In the context of Buchler’s theory, we can take proception as a substitute for
“experience.” And as mentioned previously, “experiences” can be described by means of human
judgment as “procept-complexes.” 32 Thus an emotional pattern in The Kiln can also be seen as a
procept-complex, and the unit of proception that enters into awareness (the procept that is
judgment) as further analogous of a “formative experience.” Additionally, in previous chapters,
we have seen that a product has “relative finality” when valid, and validation may also serve as a
reflection of “formative experience.” Moreover, to be valid requires no further manipulation can
be a cognate for the hardening of clay which possesses no further modification. The clay is
accepted as what it is, the movement is accepted for what it is, and the emotional clarity is
apparent; in this way, we see the creative process in dance as a process of appraisal in judgment.
To direct choreographic style, the EDC observed live ceramicists working with the
medium of clay and catalogued their movements to be abstracted later into dance. The exact
stories being told through dance that emulate “formative experiences” were then drawn from the
life histories of the dancers themselves. Because that inspiration for style (the ceramicists) and
emotional content (life histories) were so readily accessible to the EDC, the main choreographic
challenge was to convey emotions with novel dance movements. The EDC thus constructed a
choreographic method for the project in order to create the embodiment of emotions in The
Kiln. The choreographic method developed by the EDC utilized LMA as a structural guide to the
creative process, though original concepts were also devised to better understand and describe
the dance movement objectives particular to The Kiln. Considering this artistic process through
the lens of proceptivism, though emotions are not exclusively procept, the emotions involved
32
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functioned as a procept-guide, or an aid in what could be uncovered as procept for the
proceiver/dancer.
According to LMA, dance movement can be described broadly by its efforts.33 “Effort”
in this specific context refers to the factors that contribute to the body’s motion, summarized in
LMA as flow, weight, time, and space. Each effort factor is differentiated by its quality, which in
turn is further categorized into two polarities known as effort elements, said to either
be indulgent or fighting. Applied effort, however, obviously requires motivation for the dancer to
move, which can sometimes be viewed as an emotional impetus. This possible relationship
between emotion and the motivation to move was the prime focus of the EDC’s choreographic
method devised for The Kiln, as it relates directly to the labor of conveying emotion in dance.
Movement motivators are referred to in LMA as effort drives, of which four general
categories are recognized: vision, action, spell, and passion. Hence, the EDC also made use of
the LMA effort drives as a foundation to the formulation of its choreographic method for the
expression of emotion in The Kiln. Among the effort drives, passion drive is the only category
LMA clearly associates with emotions. According to LMA, passion drive is unconcerned with
the dancer’s external environment, but rather connects the dancer to an awareness of internal
feelings.34 Passion drive therefore excludes the effort factor of space, or in this sense the motor
connections outside the personal kinesphere (the reachable area) of the dancer. Passion
drive without space is further explained in LMA to be without rationality, as space is considered
to be the area of focused mental activity. This absence of reason in passion drive thus gives way
to the insular feelings of the dancer, often tending toward either negative or positive sensations.
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At first glance, passion drive may be seen through the lens of proceptivism as devoid of
artistic query, being that space involves mental reasoning. However, as emphasized in chapter 3,
even if it is solely reflexive in nature and/or beyond the individual’s focused attention, artistic
query is nevertheless a direct manipulation that modifies the proceptive direction. In this way,
the choreographic parlance of passion drive becomes a good cognate for reflexive validation in
proceptivism—which, even as impulse, remains the product of planned experimentation. In turn,
this type of artistic query informs the proceptive domain by its output as an utterance of artistic
product. Regardless of awareness, reflexive validation in art, including dance, undergoes the
transformative evolution of project to product, and is thereby still conceived and logically
compelled. Pure emotions emanating from passion drive can, ironically, be committed to
reasoning—it seems that artistic scope doesn’t fall outside of reasoning or commitment, and
dance is not an exception. But this interpretation of passion drive by way of proceptivism does
not contradict LMA. Rather, this particular reading of passion drive reinforces it as the basis of
clear emotion, stemming from the reflexive. It is the artistic implementation of passion drive that
nonetheless gives it the aspect of reasoning.
Likewise, because passion drive encompasses internal senses, the EDC adopted
that effort drive as the guiding force behind the expression of emotion in the choreographic
method for The Kiln. Moreover, if passion is then to be taken as the goal motivator for
expressing emotion in The Kiln choreography, the EDC assumed that the motivation of the
dancer must first move through the other effort drives before reaching passion. Because ceramic
clay in The Kiln already functioned as a representation of a formative experience, the EDC
therefore set up a parallel process using effort drives to illustrate the coalescing of an emotional
pattern in the individual/dancer. The EDC viewed this process as a manifestation of emotion—a
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transformation from what is unclear as an expressed emotion to what movement possesses
emotional clarity. In proceptivism, emotion or emotional utterance could be seen as achieving
relative finality by a process of appraisal, via movement through the stages of the effort drives.
Relative finality in this vein means that emotional content and expression in its clearest and most
basal state (i.e., passion drive) both requires no further manipulation and is reflexive.
As passion is assigned to the area of emotional clarity, what is emotionally unclear the
EDC posited to be in the realm of the remaining effort drives. Taken together, the effort
drives that motivate emotionally unclear movement were dubbed the emotional grey-area by the
EDC. The shift away from the grey-area and toward clarity the EDC assumed to follow a series
of graduations, moving from the effort drive that was most emotionally unclear to that which had
true clarity, as in passion. Grey-area may also be understood as validation, or a process of
appraisal, and the shift from project to product—the grey-area thus echoes the general creative
process via proceptivism, as detailed in chapter 3.
In order to discover the emotional hierarchy within the grey-area, the EDC considered
the effort factors of each effort drive other than passion. According to LMA, the effort
factors most directly concerned with emotions or feelings are weight and flow.35 Weight deals
with so-called “gut-feelings,” including the basal intentions and will of the mover, and can be
compared in many contexts to an anchor that grounds the individual in movement. Flow more
specifically involves emotional feeling, yet tends to direct emotional feeling externally, and thus
is less introspective than weight. Because weight and flow best relate to emotions within
the effort factors, the EDC presupposed that the effort drives which exclude these factors vie for
the weakest emotional drive within the grey-area. (In LMA, the effort drives that
exclude weight and flow are vision and action, respectively).
35
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Considering weight has an internal quality, then by proceptivism it should belong more
closely to passion. Hence, weight deals with products, or emotions (or at least aspects of
emotions) that have some relative finitude. Weight must then weigh between options (no pun
intended), and make a sensible order of products. So, it is again ironic that what is introspective
and reflexive, and thus less connected to direct reasoning, is nevertheless active in reasoning by
its own nature. That is to say, emotional clarity in dance does not emerge out of mindless effort
but planful commitment, though it returns inward. Weight, in this way, involves individual
choice and can be further described by proceptivism as a product of convention, as discussed in
chapter 2. In addition, the compulsion behind weight could be said to be logical compulsion
since, though inward and possibly reflexive, weight is propelled by deliberation and
commitment. By contrast, flow appears to be associated with gross compulsion in its general
state, which accounts for its external direction. Therefore, flow could be said to be oriented
toward conformity, since its outward motion necessitates assimilation. Flow is indeed emotional,
but it is more precisely an emotional impulse that is directly and externally expressed.
Action drive at first appears to be the most likely candidate for the basal grey-area drive.
Action drive is generally regarded in LMA to be the least involved with feeling and the
only drive that is specifically non-emotional.36 Moreover, action drive is known in LMA as
a transformative drive influenced by flow. That is to say that action is “transformed”
by flow as flow takes up the place of other factors and thus becomes different drives. However,
despite the standard LMA descriptions of action, the EDC thought action drive inappropriate
to The Kiln as the initial drive in the grey-area.37

36

Ibid.
The EDC did not mean to contradict LMA, and recognizes action as the least connected to emotions among the
effort drives.
37

87

In terms of proceptivism, the transformative function of action drive in-relation to the
external propulsion of flow obviously represents the evolution of project into product, by way of
validation. Granted, the assimilative aspect of flow causes the factor to be prone to conformity
and lumped in with gross compulsion. However, what pushes project into product must be
initially compelled. Flow acting as an outward expression provides a sign-complex that may be
further interpreted in query, resulting in product. Yet, whilst action by itself excludes
the factor of flow, it includes weight and therefore involves personal intention. Because the EDC
set up passion as the ideal emotive drive, it follows that the drive farthest from passion would
have an opposite orientation. To elucidate, the orientation of passion is inward, therefore it is
the drive whose orientation is most opposed to introversion that the EDC placed farthest away
from passion, and at the bottom of the grey-area drives. Logically then, the grey-area for The
Kiln must begin with the drive that excludes weight.
Vision drive, without weight, has no personal intention, and though possessing of the
factor flow it is nevertheless orientated, in this regard, toward external sensations. On the
whole, vision drive can be considered an extreme extroversion, often described in LMA as being
“out-of-body,” and in this way acting outside the personal kinesphere.38 It is therefore vision
drive that the EDC set as the initial drive within the grey-area, followed naturally by action (the
other drive that excludes one of the emotive effort factors of flow or weight). The drive that is at
the top of the grey-area, and therefore closest to passion, is the remaining spell drive.
Spell drive retains the effort factors flow and weight and thus is closer on the emotional
scale to passion, yet it is exclusionary of the effort factor time, a term in LMA that refers to the
dancer’s ability to make intuitive decisions that concern the duration or timing of
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movement. Time in this way can either be sustained or quick, but always consciously consumes
some amount of actual time. Therefore, according to the EDC, spell pushed the envelope of
the grey-area—though without time, spell misses an essential component to distinguish it as
a drive with apparent emotional clarity. This makes sense by way of proceptivism, being that
time necessitates decision-making it must be logically compelled, falls within convention, and is
therefore committed. These are aspects that are shared by the aforementioned weight, and so time
is likewise closely associated with passion.
Emotions are of course complicated, though one can certainly review the quality of an
emotion in the general sense. For the purposes of choreographic method, the EDC categorized
emotional quality into three general types: ambiguous, negative, and positive. What the EDC
calls ambiguous refers to emotions that are unclear and therefore fall within the grey-area, and in
this way relate to the working ceramic metaphor as the amorphous state of clay. When emotions
become clear they move toward either negative or positive qualities of emotion, labeled by the
EDC as emotional polarities (see Appendix C). The EDC viewed this movement
from ambiguity to either of the emotional polarities as representative of the clay taking artistic
form and eventually becoming fire-hardened in the kiln. As clear emotions reach either of
the emotional polarities they are further expressed by the effort element polarity of the
corresponding movements. In other words, if an emotion expressed in movement reaches
the emotional polarity it is expressed by either an indulgent or fighting effort element
polarity. For example, anger, an emotion with a negative quality, in movement is expressed by
the fighting polarity. Conversely, the negative quality of grief would be displayed in dance by
the indulgent polarity.
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The element polarities neatly correspond in proceptivism to the dimensions of
assimilation and manipulation. Similar to the element polarities there is an interplay and
interdependence between the two. In assimilation, there are aspects that make it appear to fit as a
cognate for the indulgent polarity. What is indulgent must yield to the character of the factor,
and thus it gives-in to the literal spatial movement that occurs.39 This yielding quality is
necessarily drawn toward a preexisting effort factor, which can be seen in Buchler’s terms as a
dependency on a previous or present manipulation. Assimilation also functions with this sort of
dependency, and it yields in a performative manner in the sense that it has a spectatorial aspect.
The pull of assimilation emanates a clear but almost automatic communication, it must accept
the force it yields to. Manipulation, on the other hand, is purposeful and directed. There is a
deliberation involved with manipulation that comes from the individual acting as agent, rather
than the spectatorial reaction in assimilation (which may or may not be self-aware of the act).
Manipulation hence corresponds to the fighting polarity, which comes up against the force of
factor rather than gives way to it. Thus the fighting polarity by nature is required to make
deliberate choices, and acts with purpose.
According to the EDC’s choreographic method, emotions expressed in movement have
the ability to move between the negative and positive polarities but they do so only between
opposite effort elements. Therefore anger, a fighting negative emotion, would not move directly
to joy in the positive polarity, as joy shares the fighting effort element. Anger however could, as
per the EDC choreographic method, move toward relief in the positive polarity, as relief is
an indulgent effort element. On the other hand, movement within the emotional polarities may
occur between opposite effort elements but is not restricted to an either/or scenario. In this case,
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the emotion of anger in movement may shift to a negative emotion within the indulgent effort
element, such as grief, but anger can also move to another dance expression within the fighting
polarity. Movement along the cross of axis (see Appendix C) is therefore only laterally
inflexible. In addition, emotive dance movements in The Kiln shift through the greyarea, or axis, on their way toward passion, however the duration of ambiguity is seemingly
unlimited (with the exception perhaps of extreme timing) and can be near-instantaneous, drawnout, or any timing in between.
The shift from ambiguity to the resulting clarity (i.e., emotional polarity) is paralleled
in The Kiln with the creative process of ceramics (see Appendix A). This process begins with the
liquid amorphous state of clay, as the artist mixes the clay into a solid element. Vision
drive corresponds to this stage in the ceramic process—without weight it has no inherent body
that may be molded. The next stage is the gathering of the mixed clay into a solid mass and
kneading into a workable clump. Action drive relates to this stage as it, moving
from vision, acquires weight and therefore becomes solid, though unformed, and begins to
connect to the artist’s intention. Spell drive is externally connected and thus runs alongside the
ceramic process of placing the clay on the wheel, though without time this occurs prior to
spinning the wheel. Finally, with passion drive there is the stage where ceramicists “throw” the
clay, as in they form the clay on the wheel. The wheel now spins, as passion has
acquired time, and without space the artist becomes the insular sculptor, forming the clay into an
artistic object (shown in The Kiln choreography as emotional clarity) that is then glazed and firehardened by the kiln. For proceptivism, the process is reflective not only of utterance as creative
process but of evidential compulsion, which I have argued in chapter 3 propels art.
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As always with choreography, the number of dancers on stage must be considered.
With The Kiln, the EDC cast five dancers to perform the choreography, as this number best
corresponds with the intended choreographic configurations of dancers. The EDC viewed
the theme of the ceramic creative process as best represented by the ratio 4:1, wherein four
dancers act together as clay and one dancer performs the role of artist (see Appendix B). The
Kiln choreography aimed to have each dancer within the clay role perform movements
appropriate to the developmental stage in the ceramic creative process. The proximity between
the dancers within the clay role also corresponds to the relevant point in the ceramic creative
process. In this way, the greatest distance between the clay dancers occurs at the beginning stage
in the ceramic creative process (motivated by vision), developing alongside the process toward
the result (motivated by passion), coinciding with the closest proximity between the clay
dancers.
Here, too, we see how choreographic method can easily mirror process in proceptivism.
The Kiln intuitively revealed artistic intention, and demonstrated the compulsion behind
proceptive realization, which in the previous chapter I asserted as central to proceptivism.
Likewise, The Kiln modeled well how this compulsion is evidenced in validation. The path of
clay to ceramic, or vision to passion performed in dance, both illustrated validation and was
exhibitive of this validation’s data. In addition, The Kiln told a personal story of the dancer, of a
“formative experience,” which in practice also echoed the artist’s “self-discovery” as discussed
in chapter 3.
Granted, proceptivism emphasizes the role of process over finished product in art—even
the products of art, which compose a “completed work of art,” have only relative finality. That is
to say, even if we are to dissect a “work of art” into its smaller proceptive units we see a
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substance that is relative, just as the “work of art” itself represents only the tip of the iceberg of
what the creative act entails (is the “completion” truly cumulative of the entire creative
process?). In proceptivism, as I mentioned in chapter 3, adjustive manipulation in art is the
manifested “self-in-process,” and this exploratory and adaptive process leads to an “experimental
decision,” or several. Moreover, the creative process continues in proception past its exhibitive
function, if in no other way than in communication, be it symmetrical or asymmetrical, social or
reflexive.
The EDC’s own particular method echoes the general creative process as understood by
proceptivism, and in fact made its own actual process exhibitory. Moments of improvisation
caused “performance” of The Kiln to reveal new aspects of expression dependent on the night
audience members observed, making each showing slightly different and each showing
representative of a “rehearsal” or window into process. This quality was also woven into the
structure of how the choreography was executed. For example, the dancers acting as clay did so
in a single unit, though the EDC did not always have these dancers performing precisely the
same choreography as one another. Rather, the degree of choreographic uniformity was affected
by proximity, and likewise by the corresponding developmental stage in the ceramic creative
process. That is, the more proximate the clay dancers were to each other the more uniformed
movements became. When dancers were most proximate, movements corresponded to the result
of the ceramic creative process and were thus motivated by passion, having passed through the
other drives within the grey-area. Moreover, as passion movements acted within the personal
space of the dancer, uniformity functioned as one total kinesphere shared between the clay
dancers, though representative of the individual and, in this way, insular.
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The single dancer acting as artist was mirrored by the clay dancers (in either movement
quality or, once the clay is uniformed, actual choreography) in every way except proximity, as
the artist was in the foreground of the audience perspective. The artist role is in this sense a
highlighted version of the story being told (i.e., the individual formative experience, as the
attention of the audience is naturally attracted to the single dancer outside a group). However, the
casting of artist dancer and clay dancers was not rigid. The Kiln had complete interchangeability
between the clay dancers and the artist dancer so that at any point the artist dancer could switch
roles with one of the clay dancers, and vice versa. This switch occurred as a choreographic
choice to bring to the forefront the various stories, or formative experiences, to be expressed by
the individual dancer acting as the artist. Therefore the outcome was that each of the five dancers
had at least one turn in the role of artist, giving each dancer the opportunity to tell their story
(hence emotional pattern or formative experience) through movement. The role of improvisation
showcased a “pattern” as also in-process, though recognizable as a general categorization of the
experience (just as someone might utter the proverbial “I’m still processing that experience”).
This method again reflects proceptivism in that it maked use of proceptive direction and
domain which naturally overlap with kinesphere (which I elaborate on in the following section)
and also proceptive dimensional movement along the grey-area, with drives serving as cognate
for compulsion, and the dance itself (or execution of a process) being cognate for convention.
The role of the dancer in focus further supports the proceptivist idea of “self-discovery,” or
proceptive realization, with its exhibitive aspect functioning as both a reveal of discovery and as
active query in real-time, providing the data that substantiates validation and utterance.
The choreographic method developed for The Kiln not only aimed to better understand
and dissect the creative process of the EDC, but also aspired to provide something artistically
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fresh and new to the dance world. In this way, the EDC attempted to contribute to the everbroadening scope of contemporary dance. Moreover, the EDC hoped that the choreographic
ambition of The Kiln merged accordingly with method and achieved some degree of artistic and
aesthetic poignancy, albeit in an unorthodox manner. The EDC believes that
emotions, negative or positive, become profoundly articulate once expressed through the medium
of dance, and consequently possess the potential to be beautiful. By way of proceptivism, this
becomes apparent in viewing the “self-in-process,” built upon the metaphor of ceramics in The
Kiln, for which clay can be seen fundamentally as the transition of project into product, of
procept, validation, and so on. In addition, however, through the proceptivist lens we can view
The Kiln as active query, as a process of adjustive manipulation and assimilation, involving the
dancer as both actor and spectator, as well as the true spectator to “performance,” who witnesses
the data of validation.
LMA- kinespheric directions
To reemphasize from chapter 3, “query is deliberative manipulation,”40 which means that
our process of query in dance must follow specific parameters of exploration, even if it not be
“product driven” (e.g., dance improvisation). Though the theory of human judgment may provide
opaque definitions of these constraints for a physical application, these parameters become more
clearly defined when looking to dance theory, or LMA. In particular, kinespheric direction and
kinesphere as cognate to proceptive direction and domain, respectively. To clarify, Buchler
claims that the structure of an individual’s experience “would be the proceptive domain; and the
process or movement of his experience would be the proceptive direction.”41 Moreover, the
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content of experience is constituted by the individual’s procepts.42 There is thus obvious
potential for these procepts to function as ingredients to choreographic process, which I suggest
should be included in future study. However, what should be underlined here is that Bucher has,
on a very fundamental level, related proceptive direction to movement, and thus the constraints
of movement to proceptive domain.
In LMA, the dancer or mover functions in much the same way. According to effort-shape
choreutics and kinetography—Laban’s theory of kinetics and the system of recording movement
(“Labanotation”)43—the kinesphere comprises all the immediate-reachable space of the mover
without taking another step.44 In this context, it is easy to place Buchler’s notion of domain: the
constraints of the mover mirrors his proceptive order. Just as the proceptive domain is not
ultimately defined but fluid and indefinite, the dancer may shift spatially, repositioning
kinesphere. It is both an exact and fuzzy bubble. Within kinesphere, and throughout movement,
there is kinespheric direction along a dimension. The dimensions, which themselves operate
within three general or “cardinal” planes (frontal, median, and horizontal), can be thought of as a
cross-section of the kinesphere, corresponding to the Cartesian x, y, and z axes. These three
dimensions are commonly labeled as lateral, vertical, and sagittal. Within each dimension, there
are two possible directions, yet only one possible choice for the mover. However, it is important
to note that this choice can be made an indefinite number of times, change in an instant, and do
so in multiple capacities (e.g., wiggling fingers), limited only by the physical constraints of the
body. Hence, kinspheric dimensions are by no means flat in the Cartesian sense, they apply
globally to the entirety of kinesphere.
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The fact that dance and human movement, according to LMA, fundamentally requires
choice, exactly reflects the principle of convention, found in Buchler’s theory. Just as I have
detailed previously, proceptivism emphasizes choice and convention as essential aspects to
dance, as well as art in a general sense. So we see again how easily and naturally dance theory,
on even the most basic level, naturally aligns with proceptivism and the theory of human
judgment. Furthermore, just as each dimension in LMA has one possible direction, so too does
the dancer or individual have one proceptive direction, which Buchler stresses as a
“metaphysical fact.”45 Granted, Buchler asserts that there is one unitary motion of the individual,
and in LMA there may appear to be multiple directions. However, according to LMA, the
individual could still be considered metaphysically intact according to human judgment, because
the choice of movement dictates one direction; two limbs moving in different dimensions
nevertheless enact singular decisions of one direction each. LMA thus illustrates the singularity
of direction through its concept of dimension.
Communication
What occurs in dance happens, unavoidably, within a dancer’s kinesphere, and thereby in
the physicalized proceptive domain. Moreover, as I’ve shown, like all art, dance communicates,
even privately or reflexively, and it does so with movement (and even a static body requires
movement to be placed in its arrangement). What this fact further implies is that the products of
dance (in its domain) involuntarily signal, whether these signals be received or validated or not.
Buchler argues that “whatever emanates from any proceptive domain as a product”46 can signal
as an act or assertion. He reassures that “acts and assertions are products,” and that “the same
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[principle] applies to the constituents of acts, such as movements and gestures, and to the
constituents of assertions, such as words and other types of signs.”47
To elucidate, the products of a proceptive domain signal, and the constituents of which
are signs. Buchler clarifies that a sign is “that which serves to represent or interpret a natural
complex and which is itself interpretable.”48 Furthermore, “signs are essential to communication,
but it is a mistake to think that the materials of communication are exclusively signs.”49
However, the case may be that dance is never composed of any material that is not also a sign,
for it works exclusively with the human body. Buchler likely shares this view, although does not
specify any aspect of body as not a sign. Buchler states, “We cannot arbitrarily or antecedently
limit what may and what may not function as a sign… a gesture may influence understanding
more than a verbal explanation.”50 Again, this notion resounds “that actions speak louder than
words;” perhaps dance operates as the most metaphysically appropriate articulation of this
proverb.
Granted, “there is no way of determining precisely the limits or the extent of a signsituation.”51 However, the human body and its movement is entirely the property of the human,
and thus cannot exist outside of an interpretable form of human communication. A rock, by
contrast, is not inherently communicable, unless it is imbued (either physically or conceptually)
with a meaningful sign. A rock that holds a symbolic function for one culture might not for
another, and therefore communicates nothing. The symbolic function can even be fickle if the
rock is sculpturally modified, though not recognizably so for a different community. The human
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body, however, is quite literally embodied with an indeterminate potential for signs. The human
body, in this capacity, is itself a sign.
The question that follows, then, is if dance is exclusive to the body. The choreographer
William Forsythe has recently challenged the common assumption that dance requires the human
body. In 2014, Forsythe “choreographed” Black Flags, a computer programmed routine for
robotic limbs to wave black flags. Forsythe was adamant that this creative effort was genuine
choreography.52 Although, even in this animatronic performance, the body remains our safety net
that allows confidence in our explorations—the body as choreographer, an undeniable precedent
to Black Flags, creates the space that becomes nonlimiting to sign-material, as well as opens the
door to multimedia discovery, be it animatronic or otherwise. It should be noted also that the
dancer may manipulate props, various instruments, use voice, and wear costume, but all could be
easily viewed as physical extensions of body. In other words, body is still a presence, and even in
accounts of choreography where the body is not immediate and physical, dance nevertheless
communicates—that is, if we are to accept Forsythe’s flag work, and others like it, as
choreography in the first place. However, continuing to humor this idea of dance reaching
outside of its own physical body, and thus dealing directly with non-sign material, it is important
to further stress that dance must still communicate. This is because the non-sign material is as yet
a product of proceptive domain, and by extension a product of the body’s kinesphere, albeit
metaphysically.
According to Buchler, each product holds potential to communicate, and each product a
judgment that is part of the “proceiver’s world,” or proceptive domain, and the proceptive
direction. He writes:
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“The product… has a voice… Every product is a judgment. A judgment is a
pronouncement: every product is a commentary on the proceiver’s world as well as a
faint image of the proceptive direction. It is a version, a rendition of nature, born of
manipulation... Any product, moreover, can function to communicate.”53
In sum, proceptivism contends that dance communicates, either by signs (as it may always do),
or by products that are of non-sign material. This communication “requires individual
direction”54 and, in turn, direction requires movement. Even more succinctly put: movement
communicates, and communication moves. In considering this indelible link between dance and
communication, dance once again becomes a most convenient candidate for applying the
principles of proception. However, that communication is fundamental to dance (even in its
farthest distance from an immediately present human) is clear enough, it remains to show what
types of communication (in terms of Buchler’s theory) dance most readily utilizes.
According to the theory of human judgment, dance appears to function initially, and
perhaps most obviously, within reflexive communication. This is primarily the result of
validation in art (and by extension dance) originating privately. Buchler describes reflexive
communication as “that species of communication wherein an individual both manipulates and
interprets signs, or communicates with himself.”55 Dance meets and exceeds this criteria; dance
intimately self-communicates because the dancer’s manipulation is a manipulation of the
dancer’s own body, which is inherently of a sign. Further, these signs are at first interpreted
privately by the dancer, even if it is abstract or impressionable. Dance thus cannot help but be
both manipulating and interpreting.
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Of course, the arts in general could be said to achieve reflexive communication,
especially concerning private validation, but dance is among the cleanest examples—the human
who does not simultaneously manipulate and interpret ceases to move. Or more dramatically put,
ceases to have a body. Granted, Forsythe’s work in robotics makes aspects of communication
more problematic, but as I have stressed earlier, there is nonetheless body present in this type of
work, and this body or bodies must manipulate and interpret, or validate, at first privately, be it
signs or non-sign (yet communicable) material. And on the point of interpretation, Buchler
makes the assumption that “any attempt to determine an instance of sign-manipulation is relative
to some cross section of the proceptive domain.”56 Again, here we see a cognate to the
dimensions of LMA, which cut through space as a cross section to kinesphere. What is reflexive
is thereby fundamentally a continuation of movement, and thus appropriate to dance.
But dance is not limited to reflexive communication. Rather, all three modes of
communication in Buchler’s theory of human judgment occur within dance, just as all modes of
communication generally operate side by side. Symmetrical communication, for instance, works
as “both an instrument of animal survival and a vehicle of abstract knowledge.”57 On this point
dance also offers a perfect analog: the medium emerges from the most basic form of human
survival, which is physical existence (i.e., the body), while also producing artistic abstractions. In
addition, symmetrical communication has been described by Buchler as “both the condition of
awareness and the fruit of awareness.”58 In this way, also, dance clearly applies as an artform,
since essential to human movement is body awareness, which simultaneously provides the
communicative products of awareness.
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Asymmetrical communication is a less apparent cognate for dance, primarily because its
packaging is ultimately unfamiliar. Buchler explains that “the artist may be said to communicate
asymmetrically with the spectator by contributing new elements for proceptive assimilation and
manipulation.”59 But the interpretive latitude of these new elements becomes removed from the
communicator to an indefinite degree, as this communication is “best understood through its
influence of subsequent communication.”60 Though communication in this mode may easily
ricochet out of awareness, hence both the communication’s path into understanding and its
descent from understanding occur asymmetrically. Conversely, dance manufactures percepts
with the body (a medium that is immediately recognized by both dancer and spectator).
However, the dancer nevertheless delivers new concepts via embodiment. The body therefore
becomes the notion; it is transformed like any other artistic medium and made manifest; the
“articulation is realization.”61
Spectatorship
As mentioned earlier, manipulation and assimilation can function interchangeably. Dance
clearly demonstrates this concept for it achieves an embodied fusion of actor and spectator. This
is important to note, as Buchler emphasizes that the individual in the proceptive direction is
“both actor and spectator, literally and inevitably.”62 What could be more inevitable than the
medium of the human body? Only in the most inchoate stage of action is the dancer solely an
agent, or actor, and perhaps not even then. But in the dancer’s manipulation of the body (which
itself is most crucial to dance) there is an immediate and necessary assimilation. Moreover, the
body seems to be a natural application of proceptive dimensions to art—which, according to
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Buchler, “occurs in physiological striving as well as in abstract imagination.”63 With dance, we
clearly have both of these dimensional aspects happening at the same time.
While the “assimilative dimension of man does not necessarily entail awareness,”64
spectatorship does appear to coincide with some level of awareness. This is particularly true for
dance, the very act of which is spectatorial. Again, that is not to say that dance demands an
audience, but that it requires the dancer to function as spectator. The individual does so while
human movement makes manifest, or communicates, the procepts of the dancer. As these
procepts unfold, at the instant of movement, the dancer reacts and thereby not only becomes
spectator but develops an awareness of some kind. The proceptual reaction itself seems to be
more important to becoming spectator than does even a direct knowledge of the procept. Buchler
argues, “not by sensing or by knowing does the individual become the spectator, but by
responding to the sheer presence of his procepts.”65
In essence, as previously discussed, the actor is manipulator, while the spectator
assimilates, and these actions are often conjoined, particularly concerning reflexive
communication and private validation. Buchler echoes this for art as a whole: “we might
understand the activity of art by emphasizing in it the aim of deliberate assimilation… [or], in
some other perspective, the manipulative element.”66 According to this view, it can be said that
dance is an ideal artform to explore or manifestly apply Buchler’s ideas on proceptive
communication, since the dancer is necessarily both actor/manipulator and spectator/assimilator,
immediately and concurrently, as well as neutral in potential symmetry of communication
(though fundamentally in-communication and reflexive). This inherent link between dancer and
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dancer-as-spectator is made further apparent in Buchler’s assertion that “the spectatorial bent
resides neutrally… within the proceptive direction.”67 That is to say, the spectatorial potential
depends on movement, and thus the dancer in motion becomes at-once spectator.
The dancer-actor’s link to spectator is possibly true even for Black Flags, since the acting
and manipulating body is still present abstractly, in addition to its spectatorship being
accomplished through imaginative movement and assimilation. This idea is supported by
Buchler’s theory, which states: “like manipulation, assimilation occurs in physiological striving
as well as in abstract imagination.”68 In essence, by this logic, there cannot be a choreographer
who has at least not witnessed and assimilated human movement, and so Forsythe’s creation of
Black Flags, while certainly farther removed from the dancer in action, nevertheless retains a
dancer who is abstractly both actor and spectator.
Furthermore, Buchler plainly posits that “every situation is pervaded with a spectatorial
aspect.”69 This permeation is presented within his theory alongside that of meaning and
exhibitive judgment, which together further blurs the line between spectator and actor. Meaning,
particularly as it concerns exhibitive judgment, “is determined and molded in the (indefinite)
scrutiny by which it is spectatorially reanimated.”70 In other words, meaning in exhibitive
judgment is a performance that is fundamentally spectatorial. At surface value, this may seem to
provide justification for the performance as culminative of process, or what coalesces the
judgment as meaning. However, meaning and exhibitive judgment, though perhaps relatively
final, are nonetheless not fixed. Performance is not ultimately a “finished product” but a
byproduct of an overall process contiguous with countless and indefinite performances—or
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performances that may not traditionally be seen as a true “performance.” And by the same token,
the “finished product” is no less a performance than those which comprise the greater process.
Essentially, meaning and exhibitive judgment, and thereby performance, never truly leave the
dress rehearsal stage, it is continual. Spectatorship in this context is thus not only the
performance itself but its meaning.
Meaning
To ask whether or not dance has meaning is therefore to question if dance performs, as it
is to ponder if dance possesses exhibitive judgment. In turn, meaning in dance must be linked to
the dynamic concurrence of spectator and actor. Though I’ve shown dance to have these
qualities, there are other aspects to meaning as it pertains to the theory of human judgment that
require attention. To begin, Buchler’s theory describes meaning as “the process by which a
perspective is shaped or revealed, that is, articulated in communication.”71 From this definition,
we can glean once more an emphasis on process, but it is also clear that dance fulfills
manipulation and communication, just as any art does. While both art and dance may be
individually difficult to define, it is certainly true that art has both meaning and movement, and
that dance is art in movement. Moreover, as previously shown, the dancer accomplishes these
stipulations of meaning at the moment the dancer moves. Buchler’s concept of meaning is made
that much more apropos to dance with his choice of the word “shape;” if there was any art that
made the active shaping in meaning manifest, it is dance. Furthermore, the shaping of
perspective Buchler stresses as crucially “participial.”72 Here there is an element at the root of
meaning that not only communicates but engages, and even solo, there is reflexive engagement
with community, or a validation that is private.
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Dance, likewise, initiates via private validation and reflexive communication, and so must
engage, even if it may emanate from a perspectival and individual source. Moreover, though a
product in art or dance (like all products) may be said to have or hold meaning contextually, this
context necessarily “reflects a perspective subject to articulation”73 to be true. Whether reflexive
or inclusive of actual community, “the elasticity or variety which may belong to the meaning of
certain judgments is made possible by the fact that any judgment, in being assimilated, is
contained in or intersects with the perspective of the assimilator.”74 Engagement is a
communicable and perspectival exchange, but also that the elasticity of this meaning is
contingent on the articulation itself. As for dance, what could be inherently more elastic in its
articulation? Dance, which shapes meaning with the elasticity of its own body, in effect carries
both the lightest and heaviest of meaning, depending on the spectator’s assimilation. Hence,
dance overall, by this logic, cannot help but have meaning—to dance is to mean something.
Validation
As we have already established, validation for Buchler is a process of appraisal, but it is
also that “in the proceptive process, validation is no less fundamental than discovery.”75
Appraisal takes on the form of active investigation within the proceptive process—not just in the
form of query, but to uncover a relative truth. Buchler explains:
“Every judgment… is a tacit appraisal… It can be expanded to reveal as part of its
meaning some discrimination… It is an extraction from an environment of something
specific to the exclusion of something else.”76
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This concept holds potential for dance, and it becomes necessary to ask: Does the artform extract
and reveal what is tacit understanding or metaphysical discrimination? Can dance explore its
judgments or achieve self-awareness in this particular way?
Perhaps one of the easiest ways to answer these questions is to explore if dance achieves
commitment in its judgments. Buchler makes the further assertion that “every judgment
implicitly seeks justification, because of the commitment incurred by the proceiver in judging.”77
That is to say, it is through commitment in the process of proception and judging that drives,
implicitly, toward validation. However, in consideration of the interdependence commitment
shares with validation, the question of whether judgments in dance are committed can be
rephrased to ask if judgment in dance validates. Granted, I have already shown this to be the
case, and that for dance validation originates privately. But more directly, I would like to address
the validation process in dance by means, specifically, as an act of creation, since it is of course
art in motion. However, the intention behind this movement, which instantaneously acts to
create, is not always immediately known by either dancer/choreographer or spectator apart.
LMA attempts to delve into the general aspects of intent with an analysis of effort, but
outside of LMA’s categorical approach (or cousins to it, e.g., Viewpoints78) there exists no
central academic guide to awareness in this regard. Yet, Buchler claims that “all creation implies
a satisfaction of the creative intent or demand, [which] is the very core of the validation
process.”79 Clearly, Buchler has suggested that reveal of intent to some degree is central to
validation. Once more, validation does not include reaching some fixed, conclusive, end-result.
Instead, validation seeks to discover relative contexts. On this point, Buchler writes: “validation
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aims to secure, not necessarily resolve.”8081 These securities we can view as commitment, whose
awareness is an implicit discovery, crucial to the validation process. Specific to the creative
process, however, we begin to more clearly see commitment as parallel to (or semantically
synonymous with) intent. To validate in dance, therefore, is to come to the core of our intentions.
To uncover intention in dance—be it somewhat describable or abstract and indescribable—is to
detect or sense the inherent pull toward justification, and thereby our deepest commitment to
utterance.
More broadly applied, this means that with the creative process itself we can readily
expose the validation process in proception, which does not need a final outcome but requires
security. This security is perhaps an endless pursuit, just as with the Socratic method, which
Buchler firmly attaches himself to. It is a journey led by the “spirit of inquiry… a technique of
detecting insecurity in ideas in order to attain greater security.”82 With this in mind, the obvious
task becomes to emulate inquiry within artistic confines. Most simply, our task in dance could be
driven by the questioning of utterances (“of any judgment and its claim, it is always possible to
ask, simply but irresistibly, why?”).83 However, Buchler stresses:
“Validation is not necessarily associated with method… For methodical validation, past
experience is the fund of past instances… [whereas] for proceptive validation, past
experience is the basis of familiarity with the present circumstances of judging.”84
Therefore, we do not need to rely exclusively on strict method but rather compliment with
experience. For example, dance can provide such an experience in improvisation, for
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“spontaneous insight is the unregulated use of the available fund of objects and products.”85 It is
thus my hope that proceptivism legitimizes dance as a philosophically rich potential in all its
forms.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

In this study, I have emphasized a significant scarcity among the existing literature with
concerns to the theory of human judgment and its relationship with art. Moreover, I have
highlighted that any use of Buchler’s theory in discussions on art remain scant (including among
Buchler’s own works), and any applications of Buchler’s philosophy to artistic creation seem to
be indirect at the very best (not to mention few and far between). This disparity is present despite
the fact that Buchler made it clear on numerous accounts that there is a definite need for the
theory of human judgment to progress in the direction of artistic subjects. Granted, Buchler
himself initiated this effort with The Main of Light, which reviews poetry on terms of judgment
and proception. However, as I have mentioned, The Main of Light does more to remove poetry
from the context of art than it does to understand it in that way. Hence, because of these
deficiencies in the literature, my study has ventured to begin to purposefully fill such gaps.
As a necessary starting point, I first took into account the primary concepts in Buchler’s
theory and applied these ideas to discussions on art and art-making. Essential to this endeavor
has thus been an exploration into proception and utterance, both as a foundation within the
theory of human judgment itself, and as a study of how these fundamental notions correspond
broadly to art. Yet, from this generalization, various components have emerged that are special
to the relationship of proception and utterance with art—the result has been the establishment of
proceptivism’s core principles. Subsequently, I applied these principles to thoughts on dance, as
well as an analysis of choreographic process: for the latter, using LMA and its cognates with
proceptivism to illustrate how proceptivism naturally functions within choreography, and how
proceptivism might be utilized to inform dance creation in this way.
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In a nutshell, my study has thereby sought to satisfy two basic assertions: first, that the
mechanics of proception are analogous to the creative process in art, and that proception is itself
a creative process, and so likely crucial to all creative effort. Through the lens of proception and
the theory of human judgment, I argue that we can gain new understandings of art and artmaking. In addition, we can use this lens to inform art’s creative acts, an overall approach that I
have called “proceptivism.” Secondly, I advocated for dance as an ideal medium for the
exploration of proceptivism, providing clarity and awareness of proception in art, particularly by
means of the choreographic process. However, this study has meant more to me than just a
collection of new terms that might one day have the honor of being thrown into the great heap of
performance theory jargon. It has even meant more to me than acquiring a new philosophic
perspective. Rather, what this investigation has done is influence me as a creator, specifically a
choreographer.
In my analysis of choreographic process, by way of proceptivism, I have used my own
choreography as a working example. While it is true that hindsight is 20/20, proceptivism did not
so much offer me the opportunity to uncover “mistakes” I would want to fix, but a self-affirming
awareness of an inherently creative process that has strengthened my creative choices and made
new discoveries more possible. In other words, this analysis of my work has hinted at the
potential an awareness of proceptivism might have in the actual act of creation. This approach
should be developed by artists in the future to truly begin to understand the implications of
including proceptivism as a guiding force in choreography (or any artistic medium for that
matter).
Human movement is, as it is, a creative act endowed with procept. The moving body
cannot help but be so. Proceptivism, therefore, does not invent anything new with dance. Rather,
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it gives us a fresh awareness to the metaphysical minutia of our innate creativity, and an
analytical view that may help to shape our deliberate creative acts. However, proceptivism in this
way does not tell the creative what to do, but instead aids the artist in making informed choices.
In part, proceptivism accomplishes this by simply revealing procept or proception in art, which
can support the artist in making process manifest. But for the dancer at least, proceptivism also
offers a philosophic lexicon that, as I have shown, easily pairs with (and even enhances) present
traditions of dance theory and critique, particularly LMA. In addition, by emphasizing process
and illuminating creative choice, proceptivism seeks to empower the individual artist. This sense
of empowerment I have personally felt possible when reviewing my own work through the lens
of proceptivism. It is thus my opinion that this specific aspect of proceptivism as an empowering
force is yet another area that should be further studied, especially as it may overlap with welldeveloped modes of empowerment in theatre and movement, such as Augusto Boal’s Theatre of
the Oppressed.
In essence, proceptivism has the potential to provide a new form of artistic literacy,
which appears to be particularly true (or perhaps the most readily available) for dance and
choreography. We have strived for centuries to make the art of human movement more literate
and more profoundly understood by theoretical and philosophic means; to borrow from
Buchler’s ideas is merely a continuation of this exploration. Hence, the development of
proceptivism could also open a necessary avenue of discussion for the expansion of dance
scholarship in this vein. Perhaps this type of added literacy may help dance scholarship to keep
dance farther from assumption and closer to analysis—or as Laban puts is, to “know a little less
and understand a little more.”1
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Buchler has frequently expressed how his theory of human judgment might be propelled
forward in research, and art has been a common thread to this point. Yet, including art in the
topic of human judgment has only been sparsely done, even by Buchler, and including Buchler’s
theory to artistic creation is virtually non-existent. Clearly then, art is an overlooked area in the
theory of human judgment, and it would be foolish not to pursue this subject to a greater degree.
Moreover, the case could easily be made that art is a critical ingredient for the long-term survival
of Buchler’s theory, not to mention its growth potential. In this light, proceptivism could likely
reinvigorate the theory of human judgment, which appears to have unfortunately thinned in the
literature of recent years. Additionally, the application of proceptivism to dance frees this
potential in a highly accessible manner, which I have advocated for as an important path for
future development. It is therefore my hope that this study has not only exposed the natural
inclination of proceptivism toward dance and choreography, but laid the appropriate foundation
for dance research to grow in that particular direction.
By means of proceptivism I have striven to formulate fresh viewpoints on choreography
that both compliment existing dance theory, such as LMA, and help to expound on it. The next
step (no pun intended) is now to directly implement the active creation of a choreographic work
(or choreography-in-process) utilizing these perspectives in proceptivism and the theory of
human judgment, and in so doing discover new ones. Above all, it is my desire that any
implementation of proceptivism in dance creation does so as an act of query. Buchler has made it
clear in his many works that query is central to philosophic discourse and exploration, and
implies that art as a “species” of query can act as the “exploratory” aspect that Buchler felt his
theory needed. Therefore, art as an exploratory effort in Buchler’s theory is essentially what
proceptivism is meant to be, and at its heart is query. So too can the query of proceptivism push
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the choreographic effort, just as any project transforms to product, and just as art of any medium
is validated, be it a “finished work” or self-conscious as an on-going process. In all cases,
proceptivism requires application—it must take an active role in artistic endeavor in order to
grow in dance, art, or to enhance Buchler’s own theory as the “exploratory” element.
Furthermore, a natural place for applied-proceptivism in dance to progress would be an
extended investigation into the interchange between community and the individual choreographer
within the creative process. This would necessarily include a consideration of spectatorship
found within the creative work itself, and in its communication. I hope also that this investigation
into applied-proceptivism would lead toward group efforts in dance creation, with a look at how
validation functions within the dynamic of both dyads and lager groups of co-choreographers.
Granted, the review of co-choreographed works by proceptivism has already been initiated by
me, as The Kiln was a collaborative effort. But there needs to likewise be an implementation and
consideration of applied-proceptivism by multiple choreographers.
Although I have asserted that the application and consideration of art is crucial to
continuing the development of Buchler’s theory; and though I have narrowed this focus to
emphasize dance as an ideal medium for the exploration of proceptivism; I also wish that my
study might foster more enthusiasm for Buchler’s works, and place a brighter spotlight on the
man as a philosopher. In other words, I hope to make both Buchler the philosopher and his
theory of human judgment more visible. Art and dance alike hold the potential to make Buchler
and is work more generally accessible—even when taking into account the necessarily academic
character of this initial delivery. My intention is rather for Buchler’s work to also eventually be
an embodied experience. I want the philosophic and the organic to comingle in dance
investigations, and I hope that in this way we may better appreciate Buchler’s brilliance.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A—Process of emotional clarity

Ceramic creative process as it corresponds to effort drives and emotional clarity

a.) vision drive : the mixing of clay, liquid : ambiguous, grey-area, unclear
b.) action drive : kneading clay into solid clump : ambiguous, grey-area, unclear
c.) spell drive : placing clay on wheel : ambiguous, grey-area, unclear
d.) passion drive : clay takes artistic form, end result of process : emotional polarity, clarity
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Appendix B—Choreographic configuration for The Kiln

Choreographic configuration, dancer ratio 4:1

a.) degree of uniformity
b.) degree of proximity
c.) clay dancers
d.) artist dancer
e.) interchangeability between clay dancers and artist dancer
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Appendix C—Diagram of method for The Kiln

Choreographic method illustrated by cross of axis

a.) axis, or grey-area
b.) effort element polarities
c.) emotional polarities
d.) movement from grey-area, or axis to emotional polarities, i.e., clarity

